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Business has a huge role to play in helping set the tone on the importance of
vaccines. . . . But to say you’re going to be fired if you’re scared to death to take
1
a vaccine, that’s a difficult position for CEOs to take.
The unvaccinated will set the country on fire over and over again.

2

I. INTRODUCTION
Bonnie Jacobson was employed as a waitress at the Red Hook Tavern
in Brooklyn, New York, in early 2021.3 Over the Valentine’s Day weekend,
the Red Hook began requiring employees to be vaccinated against SARSCoV-2 (COVID) to ensure employee and guest safety. 4 Ms. Jacobson
declined to be vaccinated until she had the opportunity to study the vaccine’s
possible effects upon her fertility.5 Ms. Jacobson was fired, one of the earliest
reported terminations of an employee for refusing a COVID vaccine in
the United States.6
The Red Hook’s vaccination policy is not an outlier, but instead reflects
the thinking of a significant portion of private employers and employees
as reflected in recent surveys.7 This openness to require vaccination is
1. Matt Egan, Major CEOs Signal Covid Vaccine Mandates Could be on the Way,
CNN (Dec. 16, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/16/business/ceos-covidvaccine-mandate/index.html [https://perma.cc/9BJC-TFHB] (quoting Mark Weinberger,
the former CEO of EY and director at Met Life and Johnson & Johnson).
2. Apoorva Mandavilli, The Delta Variant is the Symptom of a Bigger Threat:
Vaccine Refusal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/25/health/
coronavirus-vaccine-refusal.html [https://perma.cc/4LCK-AZ8R].
3. Matthew Haag, N.Y. Restaurant Fires Waitress Who Wouldn’t Get Covid-19 Vaccine,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/nyregion/waitress-firedcovid-19-vaccine-refusal.html [https://perma.cc/T2CN-WT2L].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Chris Jackson et al., Americans Divided Over When to Return to
“Normal,” IPSOS (June 14, 2022), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/axios-ipsoscoronavirus-index [https://perma.cc/9EWF-DK7Z] (finding that in 2021, 57% of surveyed
workers support vaccination as a condition of employment); Jeffrey M. Jones & Sangeeta
Agrawal, Workers Have Strong Views on Vaccine Mandates; More in Favor, GALLUP
(Aug. 18, 2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/353825/workers-strong-views-vaccinemandates-favor.aspx [https://perma.cc/63NL-X94Y] (summarizing a Gallup News survey
conducted between July 19–26, 2021 in which 52% of workers supported required
vaccination as compared to 46% in May 2021); Sarah Kessler, New Surveys Show How
Pandemic Workplace Policies are Shifting, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/09/01/business/pandemic-return-to-office.html [https://perma.cc/AM57-Z5MN]
(summarizing the results of an August 2021 survey of one thousand employers conducted
by the workplace advisory firm of Willis Towers Watson in which 52% of employers
stated that they planned to require vaccination and 78% planned on tracking employee
vaccination status by the end of 2021); LITTLER, LITTLER COVID-19 VACCINE EMPLOYER
SURVEY REPORTDELTA VARIANT UPDATE 4 (Aug. 2021), https://www.littler.com/files/
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reflected in policies in a number of fields including entertainment, financial,
retail services, food processing, health care, education, technology, and
transportation.8
littler_august_2021_vaccine_employer_survey_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LHD-ZGS8]
(stating that 21% of surveyed employers stated that they required or were planning to
require vaccination of all employees or a subset thereof).
8. See Lori Aratani & Michael Laris, United Airlines Becomes First Carrier to
Mandate Vaccine for U.S.-Based Employees, W ASH. P OST (Aug. 6, 2021, 6:41 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2021/08/06/united-airlines-covid-vaccinemandate/ [https://perma.cc/X6QQ-ZMDQ] (discussing United Airlines’ requirement that
U.S.-based employees show proof of vaccination five weeks after full approval of
a COVID vaccine by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or five weeks after
September 20, 2021, whichever occurred first); Matthew Boyle, Walmart, Disney Get
Tough on Unvaccinated Staff Amid Delta Surge, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2021, 4:33 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-30/walmart-requires-headquartersstaff-to-get-vaccinated-by-oct-4 [https://perma.cc/882M-6K5Y] (describing Walmart’s
vaccination requirement for campus staff and regional and divisional employees working
in multiple facilities and Disney’s requirement for in-person salaried and nonunion hourly
employees in the United States and new hires); Ian Duncan, Delta Air Lines to Require
that Employees be Vaccinated or Pay Health Insurance Surcharge, WASH. POST (Aug. 25,
2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2021/08/25/deltaemployee-vaccines-covid/ [https://perma.cc/DN8M-NXHM] (discussing Delta Airlines’
requirement that unvaccinated employees wear masks while on company property, submit
to weekly testing, and pay a two-hundred-dollar monthly health insurance surcharge);
Heather Kelly & Gerrit De Vynck, Google and Facebook to Require Vaccinations for InOffice Employees, Paving the Way for Rivals to Follow, WASH. POST (July 28, 2021, 7:46
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/07/28/google-office-vaccinate/
[https://perma.cc/N2HW-FBKR] (detailing chief executive officer Sundar Pichai’s
memorandum to employees requiring full vaccination as a condition of returning to
Google campuses); Ben Leonard, College Vaccine Mandates Rile GOP States, POLITICO
(June 24, 2021, 4:31 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/24/red-states-collegevaccine-mandates-495766 [https://perma.cc/Z5DU-47MV] (discussing the recommendation of
the American College Health Association that U.S. colleges and universities require
vaccination for admission, with their normal exceptions including for preexisting medical
conditions); Lananh Nguyen, Morgan Stanley Says No Vaccine, No Entry, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/business/morgan-stanley-vaccinationrequirement.html [https://perma.cc/4RT7-Y6BP] (discussing Morgan Stanley’s policy
requiring vaccination for all persons, including clients and visitors, entering its buildings
in New York City and Westchester County); Paula Span, Can Long-Term Care Employers
Require Staff Members to Be Vaccinated?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/03/05/health/coronavirus-vaccination-elder-facilities.html [https://perma.cc/
8ZMS-N2WH] (discussing the lag in vaccination rates for employees at long-term care
facilities and industry efforts to address the issue through required vaccination); Michael
Corkery, Tyson Foods Offers Workers Paid Time OffIf They Get Vaccinated, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/03/business/tyson-vaccination-workers.
html [https://perma.cc/8AWF-C74J] (discussing Tyson Foods’ program of paid administrative
and sick leave for vaccinated workers and education sessions on the benefits and risks of
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However, employer consensus on vaccination policies is not universal.
Numerous employers have announced they will not require COVID
vaccinations at the present time or in the foreseeable future.9 Many firms
remain undecided until the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) completes
the Biologics License Application approval process beyond the emergency
use authorization under which two of the three COVID vaccines are
presently distributed.10 There remains considerable reluctance to mandate
vaccination, despite the emergency temporary standard issued by the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requiring private
employers with one hundred or more employees to mandate vaccination,

vaccination). For a summary of the vaccination policies of 218 private employers, see
COVID-19 Vaccines: Employers & Requirements, HEALTH ACTION ALL., https://www.
healthaction.org/resources/vaccines/covid-19-vaccines-employer-requirements-healthaction-alliance [https://perma.cc/Y693-DBTM].
9. E.g., Dan Diamond, Most Employers Shy Away from Mandating Coronavirus
Vaccines, WASH. POST (May 21, 2021, 9:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/
2021/05/21/employers-colleges-vaccine-mandates/ [https://perma.cc/72JH-J5TP] (discussing
the reluctance of employers to require vaccination due to “the difficult politics surrounding
the coronavirus vaccines and the untested legal issues involving vaccines cleared under
the Food and Drug Administration’s emergency authority”); Heidi Groover, Employers
Can Require the Coronavirus Vaccine. Here’s What Some Seattle Businesses are Doing.,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021, 11:04 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/employerscan-require-the-coronavirus-vaccine-but-most-major-seattle-businesses-are-holding-offfor-now/ [https://perma.cc/RG5L-AKJ4] (discussing decisions by Amazon, Boeing,
Costco, and Safeway declining to require vaccination); Nguyen, supra note 8 (discussing
voluntary reporting of vaccination status at Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase); Kevin
Stankiewicz, Employers Mandating Covid Vaccines May be Very Rare, Says Marsh &
McLennan CEO, CNBC (Dec. 24, 2020, 12:51 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/ 12/24/
covid-vaccine-marsh-mclennan-ceo-says-employer-mandates-will-be-rare.html [https://
perma.cc/RPV5-KZXB] (referencing the rejection of required vaccination by Ford and General
Motors).
10. E.g., Egan, supra note 1 (discussing the reluctance of some companies to require
vaccines that have only received emergency use authorization); Helena Oliviero & Kelly
Yamanouchi, Employers Must Weigh Many Issues in Considering Vaccine Mandate, ATLANTA
J. CONST. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/coronavirus/employers-must-weighmany-issues-in-considering-vaccine-mandates/AQ74AADVS5A5REHSYS6SIZKEI4/
[https://perma.cc/U6XE-F3EV] (discussing the decisions of Home Depot and members of
the Georgia Hospital Association to await increased supply and final FDA approval before
adopting vaccine policies for employees). Emergency use authorization facilitates the
availability of unapproved products that might be effective to diagnose, treat, or prevent
serious or life-threatening diseases and when known potential benefits outweigh known
potential risks. See Emergency Use Authorization Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 18, 250 (Apr.
1, 2020) (granting authorization for the emergency use of COVID vaccines); see also
COVID-19 Vaccine Approval Process Overview, ASS’N ST. & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFS.
(Nov. 2020), https://www.astho.org/globalassets/pdf/covid/covid-19-vaccine-approvalprocess.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZCZ-E6UX]. For the statutory basis for emergency use
authorization, see 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)–(l).
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or weekly testing of their work forces, with substantial penalties for
noncompliance.11
Employer vaccination policies also face opposition in the states. Legislation
has been introduced in at least thirty-six states prohibiting private companies
and public entities from requiring vaccination as a condition of current or
prospective employment.12 Although these efforts have largely failed thus
11. See COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing, 86 Fed. Reg. 61, 402 (Nov. 5, 2021)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, 1926, 1928); see also Path out of
the Pandemic: President Biden’s COVID-19 Action Plan, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/covidplan/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20210909210917/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/covidplan/]; Aaron E. Carroll, Vaccination Mandates are
Coming. Good., N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/opinion/
covid-vaccine-mandate.html [https://perma.cc/QD9Y-JUP6] (recognizing the essential nature
of required vaccination to conquering disease in the United States and concluding that
“[m]andates still aren’t popular; few public health measures are. But they work”); Andrea
Hsu, As Covid-19 Vaccine Nears, Employers Consider Making It Mandatory, NPR (Nov.
25, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/25/937240137/as-covid-19-vaccinenears-employers-consider-making-it-mandatory [https://perma.cc/SL3T-QS3U] (noting
that Johnny Taylor, the president of the Society for Human Resource Management, predicted
employer mandates as COVID vaccines became available); Taylor Telford, Tayler Pager
& Eli Rosenberg, Biden Meets with Business Leaders on Vaccine Mandates, WASH. POST
(Sept. 15, 2021, 3:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/09/15/vaccinemandate-biden-meeting/ [https://perma.cc/CV6Z-UES5] (discussing business skepticism
and concerns regarding the Biden administration’s mandatory vaccination policy).
12. E.g., H.B. 5402, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2021) (prohibiting
employers from requiring proof of vaccination from current and prospective employees);
H.B. 719, 2021 Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2021) (prohibiting public and private
employers from requiring employees to be vaccinated as a condition of employment or
continued employment); H.B. 838, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021)
(prohibiting public employers from requiring employees to be vaccinated); Substitute H.B.
248, 134th Gen. Assemb., 2021–2022 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of vaccination status); H.B. 3511, 2021–2022 Gen. Assemb.,
124th Sess. (S.C. 2021) (prohibiting employers from taking “any adverse employment
action . . . including . . . termination, suspension, involuntary reassignment, or demotion”
based upon an employee’s vaccination status); H.B. 2242, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 2021 Sess.
(Va. 2021) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of vaccination status);
H.B. 1065, 67th Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021) (prohibiting public and private entities
from requiring vaccination as a condition of employment until such time as vaccines are
licensed for use in the United States and have been determined not to present a risk of
serious adverse health effects based upon clinical trials for a period of no less than three
years); S.B. 5, 2021–2022 Leg. (Wis. 2021) (prohibiting employers from requiring
vaccination or evidence of vaccination as a condition of prospective or continued
employment); see also Karla Grossenbacher, Some States Put Brakes on EEOC’s Stance
on Mandating Covid-19 Vaccine, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2021, 1:01 AM), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/some-states-put-brakes-on-eeocs-stance-on-mandatingcovid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/CME7-GDYS] (discussing efforts to prohibit public

485

DHOOGE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2022 2:37 PM

far, those that have succeeded may have a chilling effect on efforts by
employers to require vaccination in their workplaces.13 However, opposition
is not universal, as evidenced by the growing number of state and local
governments that require vaccination for their employees or subsets thereof.14
and private employers from conditioning employment on vaccination status in Minnesota,
South Carolina, and Washington).
13. See H.B. 1547, 93d Gen. Assemb., 2021Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021) (prohibiting state
and local governments from requiring vaccination as a condition of employment); H.B. 702,
67th Leg. 2021 Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021) (prohibiting public and private employers from
utilizing vaccination status to deny employment opportunities and discriminating based on
vaccination status); H.B. 1465, 67th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021) (prohibiting private
employers from obtaining documentation of vaccination status before providing
employment); OFF. OF THE TEX. GOVERNOR, EXEC . ORDER NO. GA-40, RELATING TO
PROHIBITING VACCINE MANDATES, SUBJECT TO LEGISLATIVE ACTION. (Oct. 11, 2021); H.B.
308, 2021 Leg., 2021 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2021) (prohibiting state and local governments from
requiring vaccines subject to emergency use authorization as a condition of employment);
see also Sophie Quinton, Bills to Block Mandatory Worker Vaccines Falter in the States,
PEW: STATELINE (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2021/02/23/bills-to-block-mandatory-worker-vaccines-falter-in-the-states [https://
perma.cc/ZE9A-HF2X] (discussing the failure of bills prohibiting required vaccination in
Indiana and Wisconsin and predicting that such bills will continue to fail as they threaten
the legal obligation of employers “to maintain a safe workplace and could put the lives of
workers, customers, and patients at risk”). For a summary of state laws prohibiting the imposition
of COVID-19 vaccination mandates, see generally Littler Mendelson, Mandatory Employee
VaccinesComing to a State Near You?, LITTLER (Mar. 14, 2022), https://www.littler.com/
publication-press/publication/mandatory-employee-vaccines-coming-state-near-you [https://
perma.cc/K5L8-U2PU]. For a summary of proposed and adopted state legislation regarding
vaccination status and employment, see generally 50-State Update on Legislation Pertaining to
Employer-Mandated Vaccinations, HUSCH BLACKWELL (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.husch
blackwell.com/newsandinsights/50-state-update-on-pending-legislation-pertaining-toemployer-mandated-vaccinations [https://perma.cc/HMW6-YYRP].
14. For a summary of state governments requiring COVID-19 vaccination in designated
workplaces, see generally Mendelson, supra note 13. For specific vaccination requirements by
state governments, see TOMAS J. ARAGON, CAL. DEP’T OF P UB. HEALTH, ORDER OF THE
STATE PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER VACCINE VERIFICATION FOR WORKERS IN SCHOOLS (Aug.
11, 2021), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Order-ofthe-State-Public-Health-Officer-Vaccine-Verification-for-Workers-in-Schools.aspx [https://
web.archive.org/web/20210811190847/https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/
Pages/COVID-19/Order-of-the-State-Public-Health-Officer-Vaccine-Verification-forWorkers-in-Schools.aspx] (discussing vaccination of employees of public and private
elementary and secondary schools); TOMAS J. ARAGON , CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
STATE PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER UNVACCINATED WORKERS IN HIGH RISK SETTINGS (July 26,
2021), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Order-of-theState-Public-Health-Officer-Unvaccinated-Workers-In-High-Risk-Settings.aspx
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210727172256/https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/
DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Order-of-the-State-Public-Health-Officer-UnvaccinatedWorkers-In-High-Risk-Settings.aspx]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF CONN., EXEC. ORDER
NO. 13D, P ROTECTION OF P UBLIC HEALTH AND S AFETY DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC
VACCINATIONS REQUIRED FOR STATE EMPLOYEES, SCHOOL EMPLOYEES AND CHILDCARE
FACILITY STAFF (Aug. 19, 2021), https://portal.ct.gov/Office-of-the-Governor/GovernorsActions/Executive-Orders/Governor-Lamonts-Executive-Orders [https://perma.cc/HF5Z-
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Reluctance to impose employer mandates may change based upon
inadequate numbers of people seeking vaccination or who ultimately

ZJBX]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF CONN., EXEC. ORDER NO. 13B, PROTECTION OF PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY DURING COVID-19 PANDEMICLONG-TERM CARE FACILITY STAFF
V ACCINATION (Aug. 6, 2021), https://portal.ct.gov/Office-of-the-Governor/GovernorsActions/Executive-Orders/Governor-Lamonts-Executive-Orders [https://perma.cc/HF5ZZJBX]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF HAW, EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION RELATED TO THE
COVID-19 RESPONSE (Aug. 5, 2021), https://governor.hawaii.gov/emergency-proclamations/
page/2/ [https://perma.cc/ZW5J-N4SK]; MD. DEPT. OF PUB. HEALTH, MDH NO. 2021-0805-01, AMENDED DIRECTIVE AND ORDER REGARDING VACCINATION MATTERS (Aug. 18,
2021), https://health.maryland.gov/phpa/Documents/2021.09.08.01%20-%20MDH%20Order
%20-%20Amended%20Vaccination%20Matters%20Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA6FSNHD]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF M ASS., EXEC. ORDER 595,
IMPLEMENTING A REQUIREMENT FOR COVID-19 VACCINATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH’S
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.mass.gov/executiveorders/no-595-implementing-a-requirement-for-covid-19-vaccination-for-the-commonwealthsexecutive-department-employees [https://perma.cc/N5PG-GC42]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR
OF N.J., E XEC . ORDER N O. 253 (Aug. 27, 2021), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/
approved/eo_archive.shtml [https://perma.cc/KF22-U3TJ]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF
N.J., EXEC. ORDER NO. 252 (Aug. 27, 2021), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/approved/
eo_archive.shtml [https://perma.cc/KF22-U3TJ]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF N.M., EXEC.
ORDER NO. 2021-046, AMENDED ORDER REQUIRING STATE EMPLOYEES TO COMPLY WITH
CERTAIN PUBLIC HEALTH REQUIREMENTS (July 29, 2021), https://cv.nmhealth.org/publichealth-orders-and-executive-orders/ [https://perma.cc/M2P3-TRBA]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR
OF O RE, E XEC . O RDER N O. 21-29, COVID-19 V ACCINATION R EQUIREMENT FOR STATE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH (Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.oregon.gov/gov/Pages/executive-orders.
aspx [https://perma.cc/VCA7-25L8]; OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VA., EXEC. DIRECTIVE NO. 18, ENSURING A SAFE WORK PLACE (Aug. 5, 2021); OFF. OF THE
GOVERNOR OF WASH., PROCLAMATION NO. 21-14, COVID-19 VACCINATION REQUIREMENT
(Aug. 9, 2021), https://www.governor.wa.gov/office-governor/official-actions/proclamations
[https://perma.cc/4J7S-ANSC]. For a complete list of state vaccination requirements, see
Lisa Nagele-Piazza, More States and Cities Require Workers to Get COVID-19 Vaccines,
SHRM (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/
state-and-local-updates/pages/more-states-and-cities-require-workers-to-get-covid-19vaccines.aspx [https://perma.cc/SZP9-SNWU]. For examples of vaccination requirements by
local governments, see Shashank Bengali, San Francisco Will Require All City Employees
to be Vaccinated, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/
24/world/san-francisco-vaccine-mandate.html [https://perma.cc/7NG7-2LD4] (detailing the
city of San Francisco’s plan to require its 35,000 employees to be vaccinated once vaccines
receive final FDA approval); Lauren Hirsch & Kellen Browning, How New York
Businesses are Responding to the Mayor’s Plea for Vaccine Mandates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/business/new-york-vaccine-mandates.html
[https://perma.cc/J5XZ-YZNZ] (discussing the announcement by New York City Mayor
Bill de Blasio requiring vaccination or testing for all municipal employees).
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become fully vaccinated. 15 COVID vaccines are readily available to
all who wish to be vaccinated.16 However, a significant number of eligible
persons have not been vaccinated.17
The reasons provided for the failure or refusal to receive the COVID
vaccines are diverse.18 The portion of such individuals who are vaccine
15. See Eric Levenson, Mandates are Boosting Vaccination Rates, but Not Without
a Tradeoff, CNN (Sept. 29, 2021, 4:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/29/us/vaccinemandate-health-care/index.html [https://perma.cc/9E8R-NQZA].
16. See COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Dec. 21, 2021), http://COVID.cdc.gov/COVID-data-tracker/#vaccinations
[https://perma.cc/2YHD-4B28]; see also Olivia Goldhill, States are Sitting on Millions of
Surplus COVID-19 Vaccine Doses as Expiration Dates Approach, STAT (July 20, 2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/20/states-are-sitting-on-millions-of-surplus-covid-19vaccine-doses-as-expiration-dates-approach/ [https://perma.cc/MP7B-RWC2].
17.
See COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, supra note 16; see also KFF
COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., https://www.kff.org/coronaviruscovid-19/dashboard/kff-covid-19-vaccine-monitor-dashboard/ [perma.cc/M6RM-95H5].
18. See, e.g., COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor: June 2021, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(June 30 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/poll-finding/kff-covid-19vaccine-monitor-june-2021/ [perma.cc/P2NF-S9FU] (finding reasons for remaining
unvaccinated included newness of the vaccines and potential side effects (53% each),
unwillingness to be vaccinated (43%), and lack of trust in government and perceptions that
vaccination is unnecessary (38% each)); see also Lauran Neergaard & Hannah Fingerhut,
AP-NORC Poll: Only Half in US Want Shots as Vaccine Nears, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec.
9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ap-norc-poll-us-half-want-vaccine-shots-4d98dbfc0
a64d60d52ac84c3065dac55 [https://perma.cc/QKR7-EDN8] (summarizing the results of
a survey of 1,117 adults by the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research
in which 70% of those who stated they would not be vaccinated expressed concerns about
side effects, and 43% were concerned about contracting COVID from the vaccine); E.
Allison Hagood & Stacy Mintzer Herlihy, Addressing Heterogeneous Parental Concerns
About Vaccination with a Multiple-Source Model: A Parent and Educator Perspective, 9
HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTIC 1790, 1790 (2013) (attributing vaccination refusal or
hesitancy to safety concerns, underestimations of vaccine efficacy, distrust of the government
and the medical profession, preferences for alternative treatments, and perceived violations of
civil rights); James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 875–77 (2001–2002) (listing
reasons for resisting childhood vaccination as a condition for entry to public schools as
including safety concerns, the need for vaccination given the perceived low prevalence of
disease, the absence of informed consent associated with mandates, conflicts with religious
beliefs, and distrust of government and corporations researching, manufacturing, distributing,
and profiting from vaccines); Nili Karako-Eyal, Beyond the Ethical Boundaries of Solidarity:
Increasing Vaccination Rates Through Mandatory Education to Solidarity, 6 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 345, 363 (2019) (summarizing reasons for vaccination refusal or hesitancy as
based upon “low perception of the susceptibility to the disease; low perception of the
severity of the disease; low perception of the effectiveness and efficiency of the vaccine;
and high risk perception of the side effects of vaccines”); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois
A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and
Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 935–36 (2015)
(summarizing reasons for vaccination refusal or hesitancy as based upon safety concerns,
underestimations of vaccine efficacy, distrust of the government and the medical profession,
preferences for alternative treatments, and perceived violations of civil rights).
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rejectors, resistant, or hesitant is unknown.19 However, it is increasingly
clear that the United States will not meet its goal of achieving sufficient
levels of universal vaccination as to protect willingly non-vaccinated persons
and those unable to be vaccinated due to age or immunocompromised
status, otherwise known as “herd immunity.”20 Assuming COVID will
remain a serious health problem based, in part, upon vaccine rejection and
resistance by a not insignificant portion of the eligible population, the
question for employers becomes whether to rethink their decisions regarding

19. “Vaccine Rejectors” are those individuals “who are entrenched in their opposition
to vaccines, [and] are unwilling to consider information in opposition to their beliefs.”
Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 935–36. “Vaccine Resistant” persons are those individuals
“who are willing to consider information about the safety and efficacy” but still do not get
vaccinated. Id. at 936 (citing Hagood & Herlihy, supra note 18, at 1791). “Vaccine
Hesitant” persons are those individuals who have “anxiety about vaccinations . . . but . . . may
not be able to articulate a specific concern.” Id.
20. “Herd immunity” and “the herd effect” occur when a critical mass of vaccination
rates within a population is reached, thereby conferring protection upon, and reducing the
risk of infection to, persons who remain unvaccinated due to choice or medical necessity.
See Megan Gibson, Note, Competing Concerns: Can Religious Exemptions to Mandatory
Childhood Vaccinations and Public Health Successfully Coexist?, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 527, 528–29 (2016); see also Mary Holland & Chase E. Zachary, Herd Immunity and
Compulsory Childhood Vaccination: Does the Theory Justify the Law?, 93 OR. L. REV. 1,
9 (2014) (distinguishing between herd immunity as eradicating the disease from society
and the herd effect as a means of controlling the infection); Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief
Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U.
MEM. L. REV. 73, 79 (2011) (discussing the acceptance of herd immunity in the medical
community and its benefit to vaccine free riders); James Lobo, Comment, Vindicating the
Vaccine: Injecting Strength into Mandatory School Vaccination Requirements to
Safeguard the Public Health, 57 B.C. L. REV. 261, 269–70 (2016) (discussing the medical
and community benefits of herd immunity); Megan Joy Rials, By the Pricking of My Thumbs,
State Restriction This Way Comes: Immunizing Vaccination Laws from Const itutional
Review, 77 LA. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2016); Eleanor H. Sills, Note, Measles, Chickenpox,
and Other Preventable Diseases: Why Stricter Vaccine Exemptions are a MustProposed
Legislation for Stricter Vaccine Exemption Standards, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 696–97
(2020) (discussing the recognition of herd immunity by the medical community in 1923
(citing Marco Cáceres, The Misunderstood Theory of Herd Immunity, VACCINE REACTION
(June 20, 2015), https://thevaccinereaction.org/2015/06/the-misunderstood-theory-of-herdimmunity/ [https://perma.cc/5RAD-ZZ6X])); Emma Tomsick, Note, The Public Health
Demand for Revoking Non-Medical Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Statutes, 34
J.L. & HEALTH 130, 141 (2020). For a discussion of the threshold needed to achieve herd
immunity against various vaccine-preventable diseases, see Dina Nathanson, Note, Herd
Protection v. Vaccine Abstention: Potential Conflict Between School Vaccine Requirements and
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 621, 624–25 (2016).
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vaccination.21 Whatever decisions they make, employers “likely will find
themselves caught between public health imperatives, liability fears, and
a restive workforce.”22
This Article examines the positives and negatives associated with private
and state government vaccination requirements. Part II of this Article
discusses the history and importance of vaccination in general, followed
by a description in Part II.A of the three COVID vaccines approved for
use in the United States at the time of writing.23 Part II.B concludes with
a detailed examination of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) Guidelines and Revised Guidelines regarding
COVID vaccination mandates. Part III argues the case against private
mandates, followed by Part IV, that suggests strategies for private employers
who insist on adopting vaccination policies. Part V of this Article argues
in favor of state vaccination mandates with a focus on the government’s
unique advantages unavailable to private employers. This Article concludes
that public health considerations should not be surrendered to a vocal minority
of vaccination objectors. Despite some misgivings regarding private
vaccination policies, this Article concludes that it is time for the country
to heed the advice of the medical and public health communities and
require vaccination regardless of the source.
II. VACCINES AND VACCINATION
Vaccination is “the medical process by which an agent similar to the
disease or virus being prevented is deliberately introduced into a non-exposed
individual, thereby causing the body to produce antibodies against the
underlying illness.”24 The development of vaccines and their widespread
21. See Adeel Hassan, The U.S. Vaccination Story Varies Widely Across Regions.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/23/world/covid-vaccinationregions.html [https://perma.cc/G5M4-VHUH].
22. GIBSON DUNN, AN EMPLOYER PLAYBOOK FOR THE COVID “VACCINE WARS”:
STRATEGIES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR WORKPLACE VACCINATION POLICIES 1 (Feb. 1, 2021).
23. During the final publication stages of this Article, the FDA authorized emergency
use of the Novavax COVID-19 Vaccine on July 13, 2022. News Release, Food & Drug
Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Authorizes Emergency Use of Novavax
COVID-19 Vaccine, Adjuvanted (July 13, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-authorizes-emergency-use-novavaxcovid-19-vaccine-adjuvanted [https://perma.cc/AX97-FFR8].
24. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why are So Many Americans
Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 362 (2004)
(citing Hodge & Gostin, supra note 18, at 837 n.19); see also W. Michael McDonnell &
Frederick K. Askari, Immunization, 278 [J]AMA 2000 (1997) (describing vaccination as
an example of active immunization in which the recipient’s immune system is induced to
produce antibodies against a pathogen as a result of administering an immunobiological
agent in the form of a vaccine). The term “vaccination” was coined by Edward Jenner
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distribution are one of the most important medical achievements of the
twentieth century.25 Vaccination has eradicated, prevented, or controlled
numerous life-threatening and debilitating diseases such as diphtheria,
measles, meningitis, polio, rubella, and tuberculosis—to name just a
few—and resulted in “a dramatic reduction in morbidity and mortality due
to vaccine preventable illnesses.” 26 On a global scale, the World Health
Organization has estimated that vaccination and resultant immunization
prevent between two and three million deaths on an annual basis. 27
Undoubtedly, “[v]accines are literally lifesavers.”28
as a result of his work with cowpox. See Gibson, supra note 20, at 531–32 (citing Stefan
Riedel, Edward Jenner and the History of Smallpox and Vaccination, 18 PROC. BAYLOR
U. MED. CTR. 24 (2005)).
25. Overview, History, and How the Safety Process Works, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/history/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8FXF-DYX5] (“Vaccines are one of the greatest success stories in public
health.”); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ten Great Public Health
Achievements—United States, 1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241
(1999); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended
for Children—United States, 1900–1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243
(1999); Alexandra Minna Stern & Howard Markel, The History of Vaccines and
Immunization: Familiar Patterns, New Challenges, 24 HEALTH AFF. 611, 611–12 (2005).
26. Alicia Novak, Comment, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to StateCompelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 71 U. P A. J. CONST. L.
1101, 1105 (2005) (citing Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Around: Restructuring
Non-Medical Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health Protection,
12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 281–82 (2003)); see also Hillel Y. Levin, Why Some Religious
Accommodations for Mandatory Vaccinations Violate the Establishment Clause, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 1193, 1198 (2017) (citing MARK NAVIN, VALUES AND VACCINE REFUSAL:
HARD QUESTIONS IN ETHICS, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND HEALTH CARE 4 (2016) (discussing the
eradication and control of several diseases as a result of vaccination); Sandra W. Roush &
Trudy V. Murphy, Historical Comparisons of Morbidity and Mortality for VaccinePreventable Diseases in the United States, 298 [J]AMA 2155, 2156 tbl.1 (2007) (finding
that prior to the development of vaccines, there were 200,000 cases and 4,000 deaths
attributable to pertussis and 20,000 cases and 1,800 deaths attributable to polio occurring
in the United States on an annual basis).
27. See 10 Facts on Immunization, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 2018), https://www.
who.int/mongolia/health-topics/vaccines/10-facts-on-immunization [https://perma.cc/
U75A-7EAM]; see also Gibson, supra note 20, at 528 (describing the success of the World
Health Organization’s Smallpox Eradication Program and the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative).
28. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 883; see also Robert I. Field, Vaccine
Declinations Present New Challenges for Public Health, 33 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS
542 (Sept. 2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2730125/pdf/ptj339
p542.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVT8-C2MZ] (“[I]t would be safe to say that vaccines have
saved more lives than other medical technology.”).
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The importance of vaccination extends beyond individual well-being.
Vaccination has a significant impact upon social well-being. Vaccination
protects not only the individual recipient, but also those with whom the
recipient comes into contact, including those persons medically unable to
receive vaccinations or for whom vaccination is only partially effective.29
Vaccination—and the failure to vaccinate—also have enormous economic
consequences. Vaccines save billions of dollars every year which would
otherwise be spent treating vaccine preventable diseases.30 The failure to
vaccinate also bears a multibillion dollar price tag for the U.S. healthcare
system.31 These costs are in addition to the impacts upon the labor force
and productivity resulting from the continuing prevalence of vaccine
preventable diseases.32
For all of its health and economic benefits, vaccination is not without
controversy. The Society of Antivaccinationists was founded contemporaneously
with Edward Jenner’s development of the smallpox vaccine in 1796,
based upon the belief that vaccination was “an inappropriate meddling in
the work of God.”33 More recent opposition has asserted a wide variety
of reasons including “objections based on effectiveness, transmission of
other diseases, fear of harmful effects . . . religious or philosophical
beliefs . . . [and] governmental interference with personal autonomy.”34
29. Gibson, supra note 20, at 541–42.
30. Martha McCarthy, Student Vaccination Requirements: Can Nonmedical Exemptions
be Justified?, 320 EDUC. L. REP. 591, 607 (2015).
31. Healthcare costs in the United States attributable to vaccine preventable diseases are
estimated at $10 billion annually. Calandrillo, supra note 24, at 428–29.
32. See Lobo, supra note 20, at 271; see also Anthony Ciolli, Religious &
Philosophical Exemptions to Mandatory School Vaccinations: Who Should Bear the Costs
to Society?, 74 M O . L. R EV. 287, 290 (estimating that more than 30,000 otherwise
avoidable deaths occur in the United States annually as a result of vaccine preventable
diseases (citing Calandrillo, supra note 24, at 428–29)); Roush & Murphy, supra note 26,
at 2155 (stating that societal costs associated with vaccine preventable diseases “include
missed time from school and work, [doctor’s] visits, and hospitalizations” (citations omitted)).
33. Calandrillo, supra note 24, at 388 (quoting David M. Abbey, Letters re
Antivaccination Web Sites, 288 [J]AMA 1717 (2002)).
34. Gibson, supra note 20, at 535 (footnote omitted); see also Calandrillo, supra
note 24, at 390–93 (discussing medical risks associated with vaccination); Hodge & Gostin,
supra note 18, at 844–49 (discussing anti-vaccination sentiment in general); Novak, supra
note 26, at 1106–07 (discussing concerns regarding the introduction of foreign substances
into the human body, the lack of presence of vaccine preventable disease in the community,
distrust of public health officials, personal autonomy, and religious objections); Dorit
Rubinstein Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use and
Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS
L.J. 1551, 1553 (2014) (discussing safety concerns such as vaccine toxicity and damage to
the immune system and belief in the superiority of “natural immunity” (citation omitted));
Tomsick, supra note 20, at 153 (attributing anti-vaccination sentiment to the belief that the
government and regulatory agencies have concealed information regarding medical risk,
and pharmaceutical companies are motivated by profit rather than safety) (citing Anna Kata, A
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This controversy has only intensified as a result of the development of
vaccines to combat the COVID pandemic with pro- and anti-vaccination
supporters engaging in increasingly confrontational rhetoric and tactics.35
A. The COVID Vaccines
The first three COVID vaccines to receive emergency use authorization
from the FDA were developed by Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson
& Johnson Janssen.36 The Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines rely
on messenger RNA.37 The Johnson & Johnson Janssen vaccine relies upon

Postmodern Pandora’s Box: Anti-Vaccination Misinformation on the Internet, 28 VACCINE
1709, 1713 (2010)).
35. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 743 v. Cent. States, Se.
& Sw. Areas Health & Welfare & Pension Funds, 566 F. Supp. 3d 872 (N.D. Ill. 2021)
(denying motion to compel interest arbitration of challenge to mandatory vaccination
policy pursuant to existing collective bargaining agreements); Bridges v. Hous. Methodist
Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 3d 525 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (dismissing wrongful termination claim
that argued that COVID vaccination requirement violates the Nuremberg Code). One
hundred fifty-three workers were ultimately terminated or resigned after failing to meet
the June 7, 2021 deadline for vaccination. See Jesus Jiménez & Neil Vigdor, 153 Texas
Hospital Workers are Fired or Resign over Mandatory Vaccine Policy, N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/us/houston-hospital-covid-vaccine.html
[https://perma.cc/78ZN-8GAV]; see also Richard Pan, Anti-Vaccine Extremism is Akin to
Domestic Terrorism, WASH. P OST (Feb. 28, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/anti-vaccine-extremism-is-akin-to-domestic-terrorism/2021/02/26/736aee22787e-11eb-8115-9ad5e9c02117_story.html [https://perma.cc/RUE9-NXPK] (contending
that anti-COVID vaccination campaigns are propaganda in an effort to market “alternative
remedies and magical supplements,” which could result in unnecessary deaths and is thus
akin to domestic terrorism); Isaac Stanley-Becker, Resistance to Vaccine Mandates is Building.
A Powerful Network is Helping., WASH. POST (May 26, 2021, 1:28 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/health/2021/05/26/vaccine-mandate-litigation-siri-glimstad-ican/
[https://perma.cc/9NZZ-JB3R] (describing the efforts of the Informed Consent Action
Network and its attorneys at the law firm of Siri & Glimstad to dissuade employers from
mandating COVID vaccines through threats of litigation).
36. See COVID-19 Vaccine Approval Process Overview, supra note 10. For
discussion of emergency use authorization, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
37. mRNA vaccines trigger an immune response by instructing cells to produce
spike proteins found on the surface of the COVID virus. See Understanding mRNA COVID-19
Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.cdc.
gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/mrna.html#:~:text=Messenger%20
RNA%20(mRNA)%20vaccines%20teach,serious%20consequences%20of%20getting%2
0sick [https://perma.cc/8DPZ-4ANR]. These proteins are displayed on the surface of cells
and generate the production of antibodies protecting recipients from infection when exposed to
the actual virus. See id. The mRNA vaccines are relatively new although research regarding

493

DHOOGE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2022 2:37 PM

viral vector technology.38
Pfizer-BioNTech’s vaccine was approved for emergency use in individuals
sixteen years of age and older in December 2020, in individuals twelve
through fifteen years of age in May 2021, and in individuals five through
eleven years of age in October 2021.39 The vaccine received full and final
approval by the FDA for individuals sixteen years of age and older on
August 23, 2021.40 Moderna’s vaccine was approved for emergency use
in individuals eighteen years of age and older in December 2020 and received
full approval for individuals eighteen years of age and older on January
31, 2022.41 On June 17, 2022, the FDA authorized emergency use of the
their development and effectiveness against infections such as influenza, Zika, rabies, and
cytomegalovirus has been ongoing for many years. Id.
38. Viral vectors were first created in the 1970s and utilized in the development of
vaccines to combat diseases such as Ebola, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), influenza,
and Zika and in gene therapy, cancer treatments, and molecular biology research. Understanding
Viral Vector COVID-19 Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 13,
2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/viralvector.
html#:~:text=COVID%2D19%20viral%20vector%20vaccines,but%20a%20different%2
C%20harmless%20virus [https://perma.cc/H3PF-5UG6]. The COVID viral vector vaccine
introduces a harmless virus into the human body which utilizes cells to produc e spike
proteins which are only found on the surface of the virus that causes COVID. Id. These
spike proteins trigger the immune system to produce antibodies and activate other cells to
combat what it believes to be an infection. Id. This learned response allows the body
to combat infection when the recipient is exposed to the actual virus. Id.
39. Authorizations of Emergency Use of Two Biological Products During the
COVID-19 Pandemic; Availability, 86 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Jan. 19, 2021); News Release,
Food & Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine for Emergency
Use in Children 5 through 11 Years of Age (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine-emergencyuse-children-5-through-11-years-age [https://perma.cc/H9B7-C4Qg]; Letter from Denise
M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Elisa Harkins, Global Senior
Dir., Pfizer Inc. (Aug. 23, 2021) (reconfirming authorization of the Pfizer-BioNTech
vaccine for emergency use in individuals sixteen years of age or older on December 11,
2020 and authorizing use in individuals twelve to fifteen years of age); News Release,
Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing
Emergency Use Authorization for First COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 11, 2020), https://
www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/3UW4-9DAF].
40. News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine
(Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-firstcovid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/53AG-KLL5]; Sharon LaFraniere & Noah Weiland,
F.D.A Fully Approves Pfizer-BioNTech’s Vaccine, a First for a Covid-19 Shot, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/23/health/pfizer-vaccine-approval-fda.
html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/CG4T-F2J4].
41. Authorizations of Emergency Use of Two Biological Products During the
COVID-19 Pandemic; Availability, 86 Fed. Reg. at 5200; see also Letter from Jacqueline
A. O’Shaughnessy, Acting Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Michelle Olson,
Associate Director of Regulatory Affairs, ModernaTX, Inc. (Mar. 29, 2022) (reconfirming
authorization of Moderna vaccine for emergency use in individuals eighteen years of age
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Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines for individuals down to six
months of age.42 Johnson & Johnson Janssen’s vaccine was approved for
emergency use in individuals eighteen years of age and older in February
2021.43 However, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) concluded
that there was a “plausible causal relationship” between the vaccine and
thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome.44 This relationship caused
the FDA to temporarily suspend distribution of the vaccine on April 13,
2021.45 Distribution of the vaccine resumed on April 23, 2021, with
cautionary instructions for potential recipients.46
or older on December 18, 2021); News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes
Additional Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing Emergency Use Authorization
for Second COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-takes-additional-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-useauthorization-second-covid [https://perma.cc/E97H-VTCE]; News Release, Food & Drug
Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Takes Key Action by Approving Second
COVID-19 Vaccine (Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/
coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-takes-key-action-approving-second-covid-19-vaccine
[https://perma.cc/3MV4-ZHWQ].
42. News Release, Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA
Authorizes Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccines for Children Down to 6
Months of Age (June 17, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/
coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-authorizes-moderna-and-pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccineschildren [https://perma.cc/UFW4-B3BV].
43. Authorizations of Emergency Use of Certain Biological Products During the
COVID-19 Pandemic; Availability, 86 Fed. Reg. 28,608 (May 27, 2021); see Letter from
Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ruta Walawalkar, U.S.
Vaccines, Reg. Aff., Janssen Biotech, Inc. (Feb. 27, 2021); News Release, Food & Drug
Admin., FDA Issues Emergency Use Authorization for Third COVID-19 Vaccine (Feb.
27, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-issues-emergencyuse-authorization-third-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/WY4T-F7YQ].
44. Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine: Overview and Safety, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 4, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/janssen.html [https://perma.cc/2NLX-FH8X].
45. FDA Statement, Food & Drug Admin., Joint CDC and FDA Statement on
Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 Vaccine (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
press-announcements/joint-cdc-and-fda-statement-johnson-johnson-covid-19-vaccine
[https://perma.cc/Q2UQ-AEAS].
46. See Letter from Marion Gruber, Dir., Off. of Vaccines Res. & Rev., Ctr. for
Biologics Evaluation & Res., U.S. Food & Drug Admn., to Ruta Walawalkar, U.S. Vaccines,
Reg. Aff., Janssen Biotech, Inc. 3 (Apr. 23, 2021); News Release, Food & Drug Admin.,
FDA and CDC Lift Recommended Pause on Johnson & Johnson (Janssen) COVID-19
Vaccine Use Following Thorough Safety Review (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/
news-events/press-announcements/fda-and-cdc-lift-recommended-pause-johnson-johnsonjanssen-covid-19-vaccine-use-following-thorough [https://perma.cc/RSY5-V3MM]; News
Release, Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Limits Use of
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B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and COVID Vaccines
On December 16, 2020, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued its long-awaited technical assistance questions
and answers, entitled What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws (Guidelines), regarding
employer-mandated COVID vaccines in anticipation of their availability
to the public.47 The EEOC updated the Guidelines on May 28, 2021, after
COVID vaccines became widely available to the public (Revised Guidelines).48
The Guidelines and Revised Guidelines addressed a broad spectrum of
issues including: disability-related inquiries, the confidentiality of medical
information, reasonable accommodations pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
pandemic-related harassment on the basis of national origin, age and
pregnancy discrimination, and the application of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act.49 Most importantly, for purposes of this Article,
the Guidelines and Revised Guidelines authorized private employers to
require vaccination as a condition of employment under tightly regulated
circumstances relating to disabilities and religious objections to vaccination.50
The Guidelines affirmed that employers may have a qualification
standard that includes “a requirement that an individual shall not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of individuals in the workplace.”51 The
determination of whether “a particular employee poses a direct threat” is
to be “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most
current medical knowledge,” including “the level of community spread,”
statements by the CDC, and assessments by the affected employee’s
Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine to Certain Individuals (May 5, 2022), https://www.fda.
gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-limits-use-janssencovid-19-vaccine-certain-individuals [https://perma.cc/5PKX-3VSR].
47. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
COVID-19 AND THE ADA, THE REHABILITATION ACT, AND OTHER EEO LAWS 1, § K. (Dec.
16, 2020) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
48. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
COVID-19 AND THE ADA, THE REHABILITATION ACT, AND OTHER EEO LAWS 1, § K. (May
28, 2021) [hereinafter REVISED GUIDELINES].
49. See generally REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48; GUIDELINES, supra note 47.
50. See REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.6.–7.; GUIDELINES, supra note 47,
§§ A., K.
51. GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.5. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)). “Direct threat”
is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated
by reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (providing for
a defense to a claim of discrimination that the application of qualification standards is jobrelated, consistent with business necessity, and performance of which cannot be accomplished
by reasonable accommodation).
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health care provider with the employee’s consent.52 Additional factors to
be taken into account in the assessment of a direct threat include: interaction
of the affected individual with others, the physical setting in which the
work is performed, and existing safety measures.53 Employers cannot impose
qualifications if they screen out or tend to screen out disabled individuals,
unless the employer can demonstrate that the unvaccinated employee
would pose a direct threat to workplace safety due to “a significant risk of
substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that
cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 54 A
determination that an unvaccinated individual will expose co-workers to
potential COVID infection constitutes a direct threat.55
The employer’s task is only half-complete upon the determination of the
existence of a direct threat. The employer is prohibited from taking adverse
employment action, such as excluding the employee from the workplace,
unless a reasonable accommodation eliminating or reducing the threat
cannot be provided without undue hardship.56 The undue hardship determination
may depend, in part, upon the vaccination status of the workforce and the
amount of contact the unvaccinated individual will have with other persons
whose vaccination status is unknown.57
Employees excluded from the workplace under such circumstances cannot
be automatically terminated but rather may be permitted to perform their

52. REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.5.
53. Id. Risk assessment based upon interaction of the affected individual with
others includes “whether the employee works alone or with others . . . [and] the frequency
and direct interaction the employee typically will have with other employees and/or nonemployees.” Id. The physical setting of the workplace includes whether the work is
performed indoors or outdoors, the availability of adequate ventilation, and the space
available for social distancing. Id. Existing safety measures consist of the number of
partially or fully vaccinated individuals in the workplace and mask and routine screening
and testing requirements. Id.
54. GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.5. (quoting 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r) (2011)); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(3)(A)–(B) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals
with disabilities in hiring, termination, advancement, compensation, training and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment including the application of discriminatory
qualification standards).
55. GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.5.
56. Id. § G.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring reasonable accommodation
of disabled individuals unless such accommodation would impose undue hardship on the
operation of the business). For definitions of reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)–(B), (10)(A)–(B).
57. See GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.5.
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work remotely.58 However, the feasibility of remote work depends on the
nature of the workforce and the individual employee’s job position and
duties.59 Employers must consider all options, including telework or
reassignment, prior to denying a request for accommodation.60 These
options must be evaluated in light of the proportion of employees who are
partially or fully vaccinated and the extent to which the affected individual
will come into contact with non-employees who may be ineligible for
vaccination or whose vaccination status is unknown.61 Employers are also
permitted to rely upon CDC recommendations in deciding whether an
accommodation is available that will not pose an undue hardship.62 Employers
must also explore the applicability of rights under other federal, state, and
local equal employment opportunity laws, as well as the employer’s own
policies.63 In any event, the EEOC envisions the determination of reasonable
accommodation as the result of “a flexible, interactive process” between
employers and affected employees.64
The Guidelines and Revised Guidelines also addressed objections to
vaccination based upon sincerely held religious beliefs.65 An employer
requiring vaccination must provide a reasonable accommodation to employees
who are prevented from receiving the vaccination on the basis of a sincerely
held religious belief, practice, or observance, unless the accommodation
would pose an undue hardship on the employer.66 “Undue hardship” is
defined as “having more than a de minimis cost or burden.”67 Again,
considerations relevant to this determination include the proportion of the
workforce that is partially or fully vaccinated and the extent of employee

58. Id. § G.4.
59. Id. § D.1.
60. REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § G.4.
61. Id. § K.12.
62. Id. § K.5.
63. Id. § K.12.
64. Id. § K.6.
65. Id. § K.12.; GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.6.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1)–(2) (defining unlawful employment practices to include the failure or “refusal to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate . . . with respect to . . . compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion”
or limit, segregate, or classify such individual in a manner resulting in the deprivation
of employment opportunities or diminution of employment status).
66. See GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.6. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)) (“The term
‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless
an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s
or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer’s business.”).
67. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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contact with non-employees, such as customers and suppliers, whose
vaccination status is unknown.68
Employers should assume that requests for religious accommodations
are sincere, given that “the definition of religion is broad and protects beliefs,
practices, and observances with which the employer may be unfamiliar.”69
However, an employer is justified in requesting supporting information if
there is an “objective basis for questioning either the religious nature or
sincerity of a particular belief, practice, or observance.”70 The Revised
Guidelines listed numerous alternative work arrangements that an employer
could provide in the event it determined that a religious accommodation
was necessary.71 These arrangements are to be determined on a case-bycase basis and include: masking, social distancing, modified schedules,
periodic testing, and changes in the work environment such as improved
ventilation and separation of workstations, telework, and reassignment.72
The Revised Guidelines addressed communications between employers
and employees regarding vaccination.73 Employers are permitted to encourage
employees to be vaccinated and may do so by providing information
to educate the workforce about COVID vaccines and the benefits of
vaccination.74 Employers are also permitted to offer vaccination incentives
to employees.75 Incentives could include time off for vaccination, especially if
transportation is not readily available outside of regular work hours.76
Encouragement and information aside, the EEOC determined that best
practice for an employer seeking to require vaccination is to “notify all employees
that the employer will consider requests for reasonable accommodations.”77
Communications with employees should be coordinated through a management
representative.78 Employers must take into consideration that some of
their employees may not have reliable access to the internet or may speak
limited English, which may interfere with their ability to comply with

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.12.
GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.6.
Id.
REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.2.
Id. § K.2.–6.
See id. § K.3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § K.5.
Id. § K.3.

499

DHOOGE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2022 2:37 PM

vaccination policies.79 Lack of reliable transportation may also interfere
with compliance, and employers may disseminate information to their
employees on low- and no-cost transportation resources available in the
community and serving vaccination sites.80
III. JUST BECAUSE YOU CAN DOES NOT MEAN YOU SHOULD: PRIVATE
EMPLOYERS AND VACCINATION MANDATES
Despite the federal government’s requirement and guidance, there are
compelling reasons for private employers to resist mandating vaccination
of their employees.81 The decision to require vaccination as a condition
of employment presents numerous issues, resolution of which are plagued
by legal peril and uncertain outcomes.82 These issues arise from a host of
sources beyond equal employment opportunity and the scope of this Article,
including workers’ compensation and labor laws.83
As an initial matter, any mandate is premature with respect to any COVID
vaccine that has not yet received full Biologics License Application approval
from the FDA.84 Mandating the use of vaccinations that have been authorized
for limited use or emergency use is legally problematic.85 Individuals have
the right to refuse a drug that has been approved solely for emergency

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., May Employers Mandate COVID-19 Vaccines?, HOLLAND & HART
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.hollandhart.com/may-employers-mandate-covid-19-vaccines
[https://perma.cc/BFL4-AB6Y] (raising concerns over disability and religious discrimination,
as well as employer liability concerns).
82. Id. (stating “employers must consider the possibility of liability if employees
have adverse reactions to mandated vaccines” and that “[w]hile such cases have not yet
been tested in courts with respect to COVID-19, similar cases (at least in some states)
suggest that adverse reactions to mandatory vaccinations may form the basis of a viable
workers’ compensation claim”).
83. Id. (discussing liability concerns under workers’ compensation laws in the event
an employee suffers an adverse reaction to a vaccine and labor law issues including paid
time off to be vaccinated, proof of vaccination, mandatory re-vaccination if necessary, and
termination of those employees refusing vaccination).
84. See id. (stating that the “Emergency Use Authorization . . . mandates less rigorous
review of vaccines than that required for full FDA licensure”).
85. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Daniel A. Salmon & Heidi J. Larson, Mandating
COVID-19 Vaccines, 325 [J]AMA 532 (2021); see also supra note 10 and accompanying
text. But see Whether Section 564 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Prohibits Entities
from Requiring the Use of a Vaccine Subject to an Emergency Use Authorization, 45 Op.
O.L.C. __, Slip Op. at 1 (July 6, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1415446/download
[https://perma.cc/Z66B-AN3P] (concluding that emergency use authorization as set forth
in Section 564 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “concerns only the provision of
information to potential vaccine recipients and does not prohibit public or private entities
from imposing vaccination requirements for vaccines that are subject to EUAs”).
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use.86 The EEOC determined that it was beyond “[its] jurisdiction to discuss
the legal implications of [emergency use authorization] or the FDA approach.”87
To date, OSHA has failed to take a position on emergency use status and
mandatory vaccination.88 Given this regulatory gap, employers should
inform their employees of the right to refuse vaccines that have not been
granted the FDA’s full approval, thereby rendering any “mandatory” policy
with respect to these vaccines as optional in the meantime. 89
Required vaccination may also be premature pending the impact of
voluntary initiatives. Unvaccinated workers undoubtedly pose a threat to
others in the workplace given the ready transmissibility of the Delta and
Omicron variants and the potential for serious and long-lasting negative
health consequences associated with infection.90 However, the threat may
be significantly reduced as more workers, customers, and the general public
are voluntarily vaccinated.91 This may result in a determination that COVID
no longer poses a significant threat in the workplace. 92 Employers may
benefit from practicing restraint and awaiting the results of voluntary
vaccination efforts before rushing to impose requirements, along with the
accompanying administrative burdens and potentially negative effects
upon the workforce.93

86. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III) (providing that individuals to whom
a product subject to emergency use authorization is to be administered be informed “of the
option to accept or refuse administration of the [EUA] product, of the consequences, if
any, of refusing administration of the product, and of the alternatives to the product that
are available and of their benefits and risks”).
87. REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K. (emphasis omitted).
88. See Protecting Workers: Guidance on Mitigating and Preventing the Spread of
COVID-19 in the Workplace, Occupational Safety and Health Admin. (June 10, 2021),
https://www.osha.gov/coronavirus/safework [https://perma.cc/S8JS-6TNB] (acknowledging
only that “[v]accination is the key in a multi-layered approach to protect workers”).
89. Charles B. Jellinek & Lily J. Kurland, Q&A COVID Workplace Vaccine Issues
for Employers, BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.bclplaw.
com/en-US/insights/qanda-covid-workplace-vaccine-issues-for-us-employers.html [https://
perma.cc/6CYU-2VZT].
90. Id.
91. See Protecting Workers: Guidance on Mitigating and Preventing the Spread of
COVID-19 in the Workplace, supra note 88.
92. See Jellinek & Kurland, supra note 89.
93. See id. (noting that the assessment of threats to the workplace associated with
COVID may change as voluntary vaccination becomes more widespread). Contra Joseph
G. Allen, It’s Time to Admit It: The Vaccination Campaign Has Hit Its Limit. Mandates
Are the Only Way Forward, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2021, 12:04 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/2021/08/02/vaccine-mandates-path-forward-joe-allen/ [https://perma.cc/
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Vaccination mandates implicate collective interests in the workplace.
Required vaccination may undermine support for vaccination, create a public
opinion backlash, and reduce vaccine uptake.94 Required vaccination risks
becoming “a source of employee discontent or dissatisfaction.”95 Employee
morale may suffer as a result of a perceived overreach by employers.96
Intra-employee conflict may ensue as co-workers will undoubtedly have
divergent views about vaccines, the pandemic in general, and required
vaccination in particular.97 The potential for discord may unnecessarily
detract from the goal of achieving a safe workplace post-pandemic.98
Employers must be prepared to address any such disharmony, as well

MEY6-KQ4A ] (concluding that “[t]he only way out of our covid-19 morass is to mandate
vaccines”); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94. Gostin, Salmon & Larson, supra note 85, at 533; see Lawrence O. Gostin, Law,
Ethics, and Public Health in the Vaccination Debates: Politics of the Measles Outbreak,
313 [J]AMA 1099, 1100 (2015) (expressing concern that approaches which are deemed
overly restrictive with respect to exemptions will inflame public opinion and work against
vaccination policy); Reiss, supra note 34, at 1558 (contending that coercive vaccination
policies may trigger public backlash); Victor D. Gonzalez, Note, Religion in the Time
of Measles: Prescriptions for Minimizing the Public Health Threats Associated with Religious
Exemptions from Mandatory Vaccinations, 15 CARDOZO P UB. L. P OL’Y & ETHICS J. 413,
417 (2017) (expressing concern that overly restrictive policies limiting exemptions will
hinder vaccination policies by “inflaming public opinion” (citing Gostin, supra, at 1100));
Calandrillo, supra note 24, at 437 (warning that approaches perceived as punishing
vaccine resisters and those who are vaccine hesitant too severely risk a public relations
backlash and inhibit the success of vaccination campaigns).
95. DUNN, supra note 22, at 4; see also More than Half of Americans Favor Vaccine
Mandates at Work, Poll Finds, CBS NEWS (Aug. 27, 2021, 7:44 AM), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/covid-vaccine-mandate-work-poll-americans-favor/ [https://perma.cc/2DJMSVKY] (noting the risks of alienation and polarization potentially associated with vaccination
mandates).
96. See LITTLER, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that 68% of surveyed employers expressed
concern about the impact of required vaccination on firm culture and employee morale);
see also Taylor Dotson & Nicholas Tampio, Vaccine Mandates Will Backfire. People Will
Resist Even More, WASH. POST (July 31, 2021, 12:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/outlook/2021/07/31/biden-mandate-covid-vaccine-hesitancy/ [https://perma.cc/AT7XSQ9R] (“Americans from all walks of life resist being told what to put into their bodies,
and many will resent any politician or institution that makes them get vaccinated, creating
a crisis of legitimacy for any government, university or business that forces constituents,
students or employees to get vaccinated.”).
97. See Ruth Zadikany, Andrew Rosenman & Cindy M. Dinh, Mandatory Covid19 Vaccination Policies: 10 Issues US Employers Should Consider, MAYER BROWN (Jan.
6, 2021), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2021/01/
mandatory-covid19-vaccination-policies-10-issues-us-employers-should-consider [https://
perma.cc/H2XD-DXCU].
98. See Quinton, supra note 13 (discussing Professor Ross Silverman’s argument that
employers in the post-pandemic workplace should focus on safety rather than requiring
vaccination).
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as the possibility of added administrative costs, employee attrition, and
issues arising from the enforcement of any requirement.99
Beyond collective interests, vaccination mandates implicate individual
concerns. Principles of health law recognize bodily integrity as a liberty
interest and place responsibility for decisions about whether to accept or
refuse medical intervention with each individual adult.100 Vaccination
requirements transfer decision-making authority from individual employees
to employers who may exercise undue control over their workforces.101
Employers are also not subject to democratic controls in the same manner
as elected governments, which could otherwise prevent abuse.102 From
this point of view, the terms of the voluntary contract underlying the private
employment relationship do not include the right to disregard individual
autonomy through the introduction of a foreign substance into the human
body through vaccination.103
99. LITTLER , supra note 7, at 6 (in which 60% of surveyed employers expressed
concern about employee attrition and 42% of employers expressed concern about
administrative difficulties associated with enforcement); see also Robert Iafolla & Louis
C. LaBrecque, Covid-19 Vaccine Mandates at Work Promise Employer Headaches,
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/covid-19-vaccine-mandates-at-work-promise-employer-headaches [https://perma.cc/
9SKG-U2PC] (quoting James Paul, an employment law attorney, as stating that “[f]rom a
practical standpoint, a company probably can’t discharge half of its workforce”); Oliviero
& Yamanouchi, supra note 10 (stating that employers requiring vaccination “must be
prepared for the possibility of having to accommodate a huge number of exemptions and
the possibility of losing top-performing employees who refused to get inoculated”).
100. See, e.g., Gray v. Romero, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584–85 (D.R.I. 1988) (stating that
the right of individuals to make medical decisions is deeply rooted in history and tradition);
see also Katherine Drabiak, Disentangling Dicta: Prince v. Massachusetts, Police Power,
and Childhood Vaccine Policy, 29 ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCI., SUMMER 2020, at 173,
184 (noting “substantial tensions” between the individual liberty interest in bodily
integrity and required vaccination); Ben Horowitz, Comment, A Shot in the Arm: What a
Modern Approach to Jacobson v. Massachusetts Means for Mandatory Vaccination During a
Public Health Emergency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1715, 1730 (2011) (arguing that the refusal
of vaccination is a fundamental right derived from the right to refuse medical treatment
and governmental interference should be subject to strict scrutiny).
101. Katie Attwell & Mark Navin, Bosses Shouldn’t Demand that You Be
Vaccinated, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/opinion/
business-economics/company-vaccine-requirements.html [https://perma.cc/WH4L-28VA]
(“[W]hen a company demands that its employees should be vaccinated, this dictate expresses
the private power of capital over individuals in ways we should be reluctant to accept.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. (“The mere fact that workers and employers are bound together by voluntary
contracts doesn’t give bosses license to make medical decisions for their employees.”).
But see GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.1. (stating that the EEOC concluded that vaccines
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Individual concerns and business considerations may be shared in this
context. For example, individual concerns are implicated by the requirement
that employers reasonably accommodate the sincerely held religious beliefs
of their employees.104 Business considerations are implicated to the extent
that employers find themselves overwhelmed by requests for religious
exemptions and reasonable accommodations, as each request is fact specific
and requires a personalized response.105 Furthermore, such requests will
inevitably place employers in the uncomfortable position of deciding issues
for which they are ill-suited, such as what is a religion or a sincerely held
belief.106
Existing case law in the education and employment fields holds that
accommodation of religious objections is not necessary on any basis other
than a sincerely held belief.107 The Guidelines and Revised Guidelines
clearly provide that exemption and accommodation requests cannot be
based on personal, philosophical, or secular beliefs.108 Some requests will

administered by an employer or third party with whom the employer contracts are not
“medical examinations” pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act as they are not a
procedure or a test “given by a health care professional or in a medical setting that seeks
information about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health”).
104. See GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § G.6., K.6.
105. See DUNN, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that “[w]ithout thoughtful processes, [requests
for exemptions and accommodations] could put Human Resources (HR) at risk of being
overwhelmed by needing to decide, on a case-by-case basis, who qualifies for an exemption”).
106. See id. at 6–7.
107. For employment law cases on accommodation of religious objections , see
Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2017) (upholding
the termination of an employee who refused a mandatory influenza vaccination based on
his opinion that vaccines were more harmful than beneficial but whose opposition was not
rooted in a comprehensive belief system addressing fundamental and ultimate questions
having to do with imponderable matters and possessing formal and external manifestations
associated with traditional religions); Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp.,
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 685–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that veganism “reflects
a moral and secular, rather than religious, philosophy” as it does not address fundamental or
ultimate questions relating to human existence and the purpose of life, is not comprehensive,
and lacks the formal indicia of religion). But see Chenzira v. Cincinnati Child.’s Hosp.
Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss a wrongful termination claim due to refusal of an influenza
vaccine which was alleged to conflict with the objector’s veganism on the basis that she
subscribed to her beliefs “with a sincerity equating that of traditional religious views”).
For education law cases on accommodation of religious objections, see Mason v. Gen.
Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying an exemption to parents who
were members of a “mail order church” and believed that vaccines were contrary to the
human “genetic blueprint”); Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Schools., 701 F. Supp. 2d 414
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying an exemption to parents who believed vaccines caused autism
and violated the sanctity of the human body).
108. See REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.; GUIDELINES, supra note 47, §§
D., K.
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undoubtedly fall clearly on one side or the other.109 For example, an employer
need not grant an accommodation to an employee who expresses fear of
vaccination or harbors general beliefs about their safety and efficacy.110
A denial under such circumstances may be legally justified but inadvisable
from a practical standpoint, given the previously noted negative spillover
effects upon employee morale.111
But how should employers address objections lacking clear religious
provenience or sincerity? The EEOC allows for inquiry by an employer
if there is an objective basis for questioning the religious nature of a belief
or its sincerity.112 However, the parameters of such inquiry are limited.113
For example, third party verification is permissible, but letters from clergy
or church officials are highly discouraged.114 The absence of membership
in a religious congregation may not be determinative.115 Further, acceptance
of vaccination by the objector’s religion is also not conclusive.116 Cases
in the education context have recognized individual objections to vaccines
as sincerely held religious beliefs despite the endorsement of vaccination

109. What You Should Know: Workplace Religious Accommodation, EEOC (Mar. 6,
2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/what-you-should-know-workplace-religiousaccommodation#main-content [https://perma.cc/U4M6-N33D].
110. See Raeann Burgo & Chantell C. Foley, Religious Objections to Mandated
COVID-19 Vaccines: Considerations for Employers, FISHER PHILLIPS (Jan. 7, 2021), https://
www.fisherphillips.com/news-insights/religious-objections-to-mandated-covid-19-vaccinesconsiderations-for-employers.html [https://perma.cc/JR56-U525].
111. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
112. See REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.12.; GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § K.6.
113. Section 12: Religious Discrimination, EEOC (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/section-12-religious-discrimination [https://perma.cc/NUL2-55EZ].
114. See Jellinek & Kurland, supra note 89 (advising employers seeking third party
verification to refrain from insisting on “‘a note from a priest o r clergy,’ as one would
request a note specifically from a medical provider with respect to a disability”).
115. See, e.g., Maier v. Besser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (granting
an exemption from a required certificate of immunization to a child of a parent who
subscribed to Christian Scientist beliefs despite the absence of membership in the church).
116. See, e.g., PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR PASTORAL ASSISTANCE TO HEALTH CARE
WORKERS, NEW CHARTER FOR HEALTH CARE WORKERS, 52–53 (The Nat’l Catholic Bioethics
Ctr. trans, 2017) (2016) (endorsing vaccination as a practice by the Roman Catholic Church);
Geoffrey S. Nelson, Mormons and Compulsory Vaccination, MORMON PRESS (Mar. 30,
2015), https://www.mormonpress.com/mormon_vaccination [https://perma.cc/58HF-8BK7]
(endorsing vaccination for members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints).
For a general discussion of acceptance of vaccination by various religions, see John D.
Graberstein, What the World’s Religions Teach, Applied to Vaccines and Immune Globulins,
31 VACCINE 2011 (2013).
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by the objector’s faith tradition.117 Equally challenging are beliefs with
which the employer may be completely unfamiliar or about which the
employer may hold misperceptions.118 The EEOC’s counsel is general and
hypothetical.119 Thus, it is in human resource offices across the country
where the rubber of the EEOC Guidelines will meet the road of religious
reality.120 Given the pitfalls associated with this reality, foregoing or resisting
vaccination mandates is the safest course of action for employers.
IV. THE INSISTENT EMPLOYER: STRATEGIES FOR AN EFFECTIVE
VACCINATION POLICY
It is important to note that foregoing or resisting vaccination mandates
does not render employers powerless. There are a host of policies short
of mandates that employers may implement to ensure the health of their
employees and the safety of their workplaces.121 Incentive programs, remote
working arrangements, mandatory testing, and social distancing are some
of the options available to employers.122 All of these initiatives fundamentally
operate as encouragement programs with varying degrees of coercion.
Reiss and Weithorn have identified several forms of coercion in their
research relating to parental reluctance with respect to childhood vaccination.123
Some of these measures are inapplicable or ill-suited to employers.124

117. See, e.g., Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655–56 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (granting an exemption from vaccination to the child of a Jewish parent based upon
her sincere and genuine interpretation of Hebrew scripture despite the fact that the branch
of Judaism to which she subscribed did not oppose vaccination).
118. See, e.g., Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World All., 311 F. Supp. 3d 514,
559–60 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (concluding that Falun Gong was a religion as followers were
motivated by sincere and meaningful beliefs that occupied a place in their lives comparable
to that filled by orthodox belief in God, possessed leaders and texts, and offered a path to
salvation for adherents); EEOC v. United Health Programs of Am. Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 377,
400–02 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that conflict resolution systems known as “Onionhead”
and “Harnessing Happiness” were religions as they addressed ultimate concerns, had established
rituals, made reference to God, and had a strong focus on transcendence and spirituality);
see also In re Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81,
92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (describing the determination of which denominations may qualify
for an exemption as an “inherently tricky proposition”).
119. Structure of Office of General Counsel, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/structureoffice-general-counsel [https://perma.cc/ESD8-5B2Z].
120. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.003, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 12 (2008).
121. Employer Responsibilities, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://
www.osha.gov/workers/employer-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/H3RV-77KJ].
122. See Jellinek & Kurland, supra note 89.
123. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 966–79.
124. Inapplicable or ill-suited options include use of force in the form of court orders,
mandates enforced by the threat of criminal sanctions, cost internalization through the
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However, at least four of these options, specifically, conditioned access,
procedural tightening, persuasion through education, and positive incentives,
are readily adaptable by employers.125
Access mandates condition the privilege of employee access to the
workplace on compliance with the employer’s requirement to undergo
vaccination. 126 The EEOC permits employers to condition access on
vaccination status with accommodations as deemed appropriate.127 Employer
denials are similar to those utilized in the educational field with respect to
vaccination status as a condition of access to the benefits and opportunities of
public and private education.128
imposition of tort liability for failure or refusal to vaccinate, and mandated transparency
through the publication of the names of unvaccinated individuals. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 968–69 (discussing conditioning access to benefits with compliance
with vaccine requirements in the educational sphere as a means of combatting vaccine
hesitancy of parents of school age children).
127. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
128. The MMR vaccine for measles, mumps, and rubella is required in all fifty states
as a condition for attendance in elementary and secondary schools and at childcare centers.
MMR Vaccine Mandates for Child Care and K-12, IMMUNIZE. ORG (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.immunize.org/laws/mmr.asp [https://perma.cc/RF3C-AT7U]. Elementary and
secondary schools are subject to mandatory varicella vaccination in all states with the
exception of Alaska, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, and South Dakota. Varicella Vaccine
Mandates for Child Care and K-12, IMMUNIZE. ORG (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.
immunize.org/laws/varicella.asp [https://perma.cc/EHC2-LAG7]. Childcare centers are
subject to mandatory varicella vaccination in all states with the exception of South Dakota.
Id. Forty-eight states require vaccination for hepatitis B for childcare centers and
elementary and secondary schools. Hepatitis B Vaccine Mandates for Child Care and K12, IMMUNIZE.ORG (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.immunize.org/laws/hepb.asp [https://
perma.cc/7R9R-W8EF]. All fifty states require the polio vaccine for those students
attending childcare centers and elementary schools and the DTaP vaccine for diphtheria,
tetanus, and pertussis for those students attending childcare centers and elementary and
secondary schools. See Polio Vaccine Mandates for Child Care and K-12, IMMUNIZE.ORG
(Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.immunize.org/laws/polio.asp [https://perma.cc/HX8R-YA6E];
DTaP Vaccine Mandates for Child Care and Elementary Schools, IMMUNIZE.ORG (Dec.
12, 2019), https://www.immunize.org/laws/dtap.asp [https://perma.cc/4ZUL-Q56T]; Tdap
Vaccine Mandates for Elementary and Secondary Schools, IMMUNIZE.ORG (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.immunize.org/laws/tdap.asp [https://perma.cc/8MEC-VVFP]. Vaccination
for haemophilus influenza is required in all fifty states for those attending daycare centers.
Hib Vaccine Mandates for Child Care, I MMUNIZE . ORG (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.
immunize.org/laws/hib.asp [https://perma.cc/23AX-9MYT]. Other vaccines are subject
to fewer requirements. See, e.g., PCV Vaccine Mandates for Child Care, IMMUNIZE.ORG
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.immunize.org/laws/pneuconj.asp [https://perma.cc/NAJ3JSV4]; Hepatitis A Vaccine Mandates for Child Care and K-12, IMMUNIZE.ORG (July 19,
2021), https://www.immunize.org/laws/hepa.asp [https://perma.cc/97TY-WT2A]; MenACWY
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Alternatively, employers may permit unvaccinated employees to enter
the workplace but segregate them from other workers and subject them to
additional requirements such as masking and frequent testing.129 Such “limited
quarantine policies” are moderately coercive and create the potential for
employee stratification on the basis of vaccination status with the potential
for resultant conflict.130 However, individual freedom is not directly constrained,
and those refusing vaccination are not denied the benefits associated with
employment.131 Rather, these policies allow individuals to make their own
choices without surrendering autonomy, albeit at some inconvenience and
the loss of unfettered access to the workplace and their fellow vaccinated
co-workers.
For instance, “[p]rocedural [t]ightening” strategies focus on enhancing
rigor with respect to processes by which employees seek exemptions from
vaccination policies.132 The goal of these strategies is to increase vaccination
rates by creating more complex and rigorous processes which, in turn, deter
employees from seeking vaccination exemptions.133 Some employees may
simply choose to accept vaccination rather than undertake an administrative
process that may ultimately prove unsuccessful.134 There is a direct correlation
between procedural complexity and the number of exemptions sought and

Vaccine Mandates for Elementary and Secondary Schools, IMMUNIZE.ORG (July 19, 2021),
https://www.immunize.org/laws/menin_sec.asp [https://perma.cc/9LEE-5NAH]; MenACWY
Vaccine Mandates for Colleges and Universities, IMMUNIZE.ORG (Feb. 19, 2020), https://
www.immunize.org/laws/menin.asp [https://perma.cc/TGM5-YYA4]; Hepatitis B Vaccine
Mandates for Colleges and Universities, IMMUNIZE.ORG (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.
immunize.org/laws/hepbcollege.asp [https://perma.cc/78PF-L7DC]; Rotavirus Vaccine
Mandates for Child Care and Pre-K, IMMUNIZE.ORG (July 19, 2021), https://www.
immunize.org/laws/rotavirus.asp [https://perma.cc/MPS9-MYY5]; Influenza Vaccine Mandates
for Child Care and Pre-K, IMMUNIZE. ORG (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.immunize.
org/laws/flu_childcare.asp [https://perma.cc/4KB7-8ART]; HPV Vaccine Mandates for
Elementary and Secondary Schools, IMMUNIZE.ORG (July 19, 2021), https://www.immunize.
org/laws/hpv.asp [https://perma.cc/4SCY-SB44].
129. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
130. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 969; see also Edward A. Fallone,
Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68
B.U. L. REV. 441, 461 (1988) (referring to policies which selectively restrict individuals
from participation in certain activities as “modified quarantine”).
131. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 972 (noting that rejectors of vaccine
mandates have the freedom to do so but may incur costs for their choice).
132. Id. at 974–75, 979.
133. See Gonzalez, supra note 94, at 437 (citing Louis R. Caplan, Vaccination
Policies and Rates of Exemption from Immunization, 2005–2011, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1170, 1171 (2012)) (noting that states with “difficult non-medical exemption policies” had
a higher average exemption rate than states with easier policies).
134. Levin, supra note 26, at 1240 (citing NAVIN, supra note 26, at 211–12).
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ultimately granted.135 There is considerable support for such a correlation
in research relating to religious exemptions to school vaccination
requirements. 136 This correlation is also supported in administrative law
literature examining “the role of procedural mechanisms and institutional
design in controlling and managing behavior.”137
Of course, any procedural tightening must be within the bounds of the
Guidelines and Revised Guidelines. However, if properly implemented,
there are several strategies that deter applications for exemptions while
providing adequate protection pursuant to the ADA and Title VII. 138 A
counseling requirement as a condition to seeking an exemption may prove
useful in this regard without imposing an undue burden upon the individual
seeking an exemption.139 Such counseling would consist of a review of
educational materials provided by the federal or state government, an
acknowledgement that the failure to be vaccinated increases the risk of
personal infection as well as the infection of co-workers and family members,
and that such infections may prove to be life-altering or life-threatening.140
Counseling could be informal, by providing employees with information,
or more intensive, through the use of internal or external medical personnel.141
More stringent counseling requirements such as the use of quizzes to verify
135. See Rials, supra note 20, at 218 (“[T]he higher the rate of complexity in the
process of applying for exemptions, the lower the rate of actual exemptions, and the lower
the rate of complexity, the higher the rate of exemptions.”).
136. For summaries of research correlating procedural complexity with lower numbers
of exemptions in the context of school immunization requirements, see Calandrillo, supra
note 24, at 434–35; Karako-Eyal, supra note 18, at 362–63; Reiss & Weithorn, supra note
18, at 964.
137. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 961 n.307; see also Matthew D. McCubbins,
Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 273 (1987); William F. West, Formal Procedures,
Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making:
An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2004).
138. See Y. Tony Yang & Ross D. Silverman, Legislative Prescriptions for Controlling
Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions, 313 [J]AMA 247, 247–48 (2015).
139. Id. at 247.
140. See Gonzalez, supra note 94, at 441.
141. See Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Around: Restructuring Non-Medical
Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health Protection, 12 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 277, 293–94 (2003) (advocating mandatory consultation with medical personnel as
a condition of granting exemptions to school immunization requirements); see also McCarthy,
supra note 30, at 598. The required participation of medical personnel is consistent with
state laws relating to exemptions from mandatory immunizations as a condition of school
attendance. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 433.267 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.210.090
(2022).
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informed consent in clinical trials should most likely be avoided as unduly
intrusive upon employee rights.142 However, there is nothing overly intrusive
about requiring renewal of exemption status periodically.143 Regardless
of form, compliance with counseling and renewal requirements should
be memorialized in signed statements.144
As noted by Reiss and Weithorn, counseling requirements are not excessive
given the risks associated with unvaccinated status and do not impose
“insurmountable barriers” for those seeking exemptions.145 Most individuals
seeking exemptions could overcome these procedural obstacles.146 Even
if they fail as a deterrent, these obstacles enhance the accuracy of the
exemption process by requiring documentation and bolstering informed
decision-making.147 Additionally, some employees may decide to be vaccinated
to avoid the time and effort associated with undergoing counseling.148
Persuasion through education is closely related to procedural tightening
and emphasizes “interventions that strive to change attitudes and minds”
through “information, logic, and reason to empower an individual to make
his or her own wise choices.”149 Educational intervention is permissible
pursuant to the Revised Guidelines and is a requirement in several states which
permit religious or philosophical exemptions to school immunization dictates.150
Although the Revised Guidelines do not specify the content, there are
several components to an effective employee education program. Such a
program should focus on the benefits of vaccination in general, the COVID
vaccines in particular, the remoteness of risks associated with vaccination,
and the avoidable risks that unvaccinated persons impose on themselves

142. But see Reiss, supra note 34, at 1596 (discussing how a suggestion for “[a]
somewhat rigorous educational requirement seems appropriate, potentially with a short
quiz at the end” in order to obtain an exemption from school immunization requirements).
143. See, e.g., Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 974; Sills, supra note 20, at 696;
Silverman, supra note 141, at 294; Yang & Silverman, supra note 138, at 248.
144. See Devin W. Quackenbush, Note, Religion’s Hepatitis B Shot: The Arkansas
General Assembly Established an Overly Broad Religious Exemption to Mandatory Immunization
After the District Court Invalidated the Original Religious ExemptionMcCarthy v.
Ozark School District, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 777, 819 (2009) (arguing in favor of signed
statements in the form of affidavits). Written statements are also consistent with state laws
relating to exemptions from mandatory immunization as a condition of school attendance.
See, e.g., HAW . REV. S TAT. § 302A-1156(2) (2022); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-9-302
(LexisNexis 2022).
145. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 975.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 965 (emphasis omitted).
150. See REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.3. For a discussion of educational
requirements as a condition of obtaining a religious or philosophical exemption from
school immunization mandates, see Karako-Eyal, supra note 18, at 356–60.
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and those with whom they interact, including their co-workers.151 More
intensive educational programs may include information regarding the
approval process for vaccines and safety profiles for specific vaccines.152
However the program is structured, it should focus on the personal
consequences of non-vaccination and avoid giving additional publicity to
vaccine misinformation.153
Incentives refer to “the offering of positive benefits or privileges as a
reinforcement or reward for . . . compliance with vaccine recommendations”
beyond those ordinarily available to employees.154 Employers are permitted
to incentivize employees to receive COVID vaccines.155 Numerous employers
have opted for incentives of various types and sizes rather than vaccination
mandates.156
151. See Gonzalez, supra note 94, at 438 (advocating educational content that
“increase[s] public knowledge about the life-saving benefits of vaccinations, about the
remote risks posed by . . . vaccinations, and about the avoidable risks that non-vaccinations
impose” (citing Silverman, supra note 141, at 293)).
152. Priya Shetty, Experts Concerned About Vaccination Backlash, 375 LANCET
970, 971 (2010) (discussing the suggestion of “educational classes that teach the public
what the safety profiles of different vaccines are, before they are allowed to opt out of
vaccination”).
153. See Tomsick, supra note 20, at 154 (concluding that “educational efforts
that are not focused on vaccine misinformation, but rather focus on the personal
consequences . . . have been more successful” (citing Christopher A. Swingle, How Do We
Approach Anti-Vaccination Attitude?, 115 MO. MED. 180, 181 (2018))).
154. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 963 (emphasis omitted).
155. See REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.3., K.16.–21.
156. See, e.g., Attwell & Navin, supra note 101 (discussing Target’s payment of
workers for travel time to vaccination appointments and issuance of vouchers for those
unable to afford transportation); Analisa Novak, Many U.S. Workers Support Employers
Making COVID-19 vaccine Mandatory, Survey Shows, CBS NEWS (Jan. 14, 2021, 1:01
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/workers-support-employers-making-covid-vaccinemandatory/ [https://perma.cc/23YU-E4NH] (discussing Dollar General’s payment of four
hours of regular pay to employees willing to be vaccinated); Leslie Josephs, United
Airlines CEO Wants to Make Covid Vaccines Mandatory for Employeesand Encourages
other Companies to do the Same, CNBC (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/
01/22/united-airlines-ceo-wants-to-make-covid-vaccines-mandatory-for-its-employees.html
[https://perma.cc/8XDS-D3CY ] (discussing Chobani’s payment of six hours of regular
pay to employees willing to receive Pfizer or Moderna’s vaccines); Jenny G. Zhang,
Trader Joe’s and Other Grocers Will Pay Employees to Get Vaccinated, EATER (Jan. 20,
2021, 12:46 PM), https://www.eater.com/22240674/trader-joes-aldi-instacart-will-payemployees-to-get-covid-vaccine [https://perma.cc/5J3U-U2TD] (discussing Trader Joe’s
payment of four hours of regular pay to employees willing to be vaccinated); Dustin Jones,
Kroger Offers $100 Bonus to Employees Who Get Vaccinated, NPR (Feb. 6, 2021, 12:59
PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/05/964660657/kroger-offers-100-bonus-to-employeeswho-get-vaccinated, [https://perma.cc/879C-YHGY] (discussing Kroger’s offer to pay
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However, incentives present potential problems for individual employers
and public health in general. The Revised Guidelines prohibit incentives
that are “so substantial as to be coercive.”157 Large financial incentives
will most likely be deemed coercive, especially to the extent that they compel
employees to disclose medical information in response to pre-vaccination
screening questions.158 Incentives should be limited to time off work in
order to be vaccinated, token gift cards, and other de minimis benefits.159
The Revised Guidelines remove the prohibition upon substantial incentives
if they rely upon voluntary self-reporting of vaccination received by employees
from third parties unaffiliated with their employers.160 However, employers
are unlikely to offer sizable incentives to avoid disruption in the workplace,
minimize administrative burdens associated with record-keeping, and
with the knowledge that comparable incentives must be offered to those
employees who do not participate in the program due to preexisting medical
conditions, religious beliefs, or disabilities.161 For these reasons, it is unlikely
that employers will offer substantial benefits as incentives to employees
willing to be vaccinated.162
As a result, incentives may prove weak, as demonstrated by declining
vaccination rates.163 Incentives are also unlikely to change the attitudes
of vaccine rejectors and sufficient numbers of the vaccine hesitant in order
to be as effective as is necessary to bring the pandemic under control, let
alone reach herd immunity. 164 Furthermore, incentives may increase
resistance and hesitancy by linking payments with the perception of risk,
thereby increasing fear amongst unvaccinated employees.165

one hundred dollars to employees who are unable to be vaccinated upon completion of “an
education and safety course”).
157. REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.16.–17.
158. Id.
159. Jellinek & Kurland, supra note 89.
160. See REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § K.18.
161. See supra notes 94–97, 158 and accompanying text; Jellinek & Kurland, supra
note 89.
162. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor:
May 2021, KAISER F AMILY F OUND . (May 28, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronaviruscovid-19/poll-finding/kff-covid-19-vaccine-monitor-may-2021/ [https://perma.cc/JR2CM43T] (finding that incentives to vaccinate including state-run lotteries and payments, paid
time off from work to get vaccinated and recover from any side effects, free transportation
to vaccination sites, complimentary tickets to concerts and sporting events, and coupons
for food and drink motivated no more than 49% of individuals to be vaccinated).
165. Span, supra note 8 (quoting Emily Largent, a bioethicist at the University of
Pennsylvania, as stating “[t]here’s good evidence from behavioral economics that offering
money signals taking risks. These vaccines really are safe and effective, so we don’t want
to solidify people’s fears”).
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Preferred policies for employers should combine minimal coercion,
feasibility, and effectiveness in such a manner as to balance employee
autonomy and the collective interests of the employer and community. 166
Relevant considerations include the production of benefits and avoidance
of harm, respect for autonomous choice and privacy, fair distribution of
benefits and burdens, transparency, development and maintenance of trust,
and adequate participation.167 There is no one uniform policy that achieves
this balance for every employer. The weighting of these considerations and
resulting draft and implementation of effective and proportionate policies,
based upon necessity, will be unique to every employer.168 That said, every
policy should share the same goal: the minimization of conflict between
individual values and rights, public health, and the employer’s interests.169
The achievement of this goal may best be accomplished through the least
restrictive or intrusive alternatives, rather than the heavy hand of employer
mandates.170

166. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 956 (contending that “[i]n the context
of childhood vaccination, a policy preference for the least coercive approach that is feasible and
effective helps strike the best balance among the public’s health, the well-being of the
children who would receive vaccinations, and the interests of parents to make decisions
about their children’s healthcare” (emphasis omitted)).
167. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 957 (citing James F. Childress et al., Public
Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 170, 171–72 (2002)).
168. See Childress, supra note 167, at 172. Reiss and Weithorn defined “effectiveness”
as “the likelihood that the policy will achieve the . . . health benefits on which it is
grounded.” Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 957 n.298. Proportionate policies are
defined as those in which “the probable . . . health benefits outweigh the infringed moral
considerations, such as autonomy or privacy.” Id. Policies are deemed necessary to the extent
that they target and seek to accomplish “the essential nature and importance of the . . . health
goals sought.” Id. Reiss and Weithorn also included that “justification” in the weighting
of considerations and policy formation, which he defines as communications which educate the
public, maintain governmental accountability, and strengthen public trust. Id. at 958
n.298. Although utilized in the context of public vaccination policy, Reiss and Weithorn’s
definition of justification is readily transferable to the private employment sector which
has undeniable interest in educating employees, maintaining corporate accountability, and
strengthening public and private trust.
169. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 957 n.298.
170. See supra note 166 and accompanying text; see also Childress, supra note 167,
at 173. But see Ezra Klein, What if the Unvaccinated Can’t Be Persuaded?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/29/opinion/covid-vaccine-hesitancy
[https://perma.cc/9AVE-TBN4] (contending that the strength of views and sources of
information utilized in making cost-benefit calculations for unvaccinated individuals make
it unlikely that any appeal will be successful).
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V. BECAUSE YOU CAN MEANS YOU SHOULD: THE CASE FOR STATE
GOVERNMENT VACCINATION MANDATES
To the extent vaccination requirements become necessary, state governments
are best positioned to impose them.171 State governments have considerable
leeway to impose vaccination requirements which may not be available to
the federal government, given the recent case law.172 Unlike employer mandates,
there is considerable precedent for state government requirements.173 These
precedents are both industry- and sector-specific and also applicable to
the public at large.174
An example of an industry-specific policy may be found in vaccination
requirements for healthcare workers.175 These policies may require that
health care workers, as broadly defined, receive enumerated vaccines as a
condition of employment.176 Other states require specific subsets of such
workers to receive vaccines.177

171. See Klein, supra note 170 (arguing that a “national vaccination mandate” would
not be feasible).
172. See, e.g., BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 619 (5th Cir. 2021)
(staying enforcement of OSHA’s emergency temporary standard requiring vaccination of
employees of companies with one hundred or more employees); Kentucky v. Biden, No.
3:21-cv-00055-GFVT, 2021 WL 5587446, at *14 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2021) (staying
enforcement of the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force’s standard requiring vaccination
of federal contractors); Louisiana v. Becerra, No. 3:21-CV-03970, 2021 WL 5609846, at
*17 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 2021) (staying enforcement of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services’ standard requiring vaccination of healthcare workers); Missouri v.
Biden, 4:21-cv-01329-MTS, 2021 WL 5564501, at *15 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 29, 2021) (staying
enforcement of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ standard requiring
vaccination of healthcare workers); see also Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 952
(contending that “[s]tates have substantial leeway to impose legal requirements aimed at
increasing rates of childhood immunization”). But see In re MCP No. 165, 21 F.4th 357,
388 (6th Cir. 2021) (lifting stay of enforcement of OSHA’s emergency temporary standard
requiring vaccination of employees of companies with one hundred or more employees).
173. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 894–901 (discussing Jacobsen v Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905), where the Supreme Court upheld the state of Massachusetts’s vaccination
requirement to limit the spread of smallpox, and its viability).
174. See id.
175. Id. at 904 n.104 (discussing vaccination requirements for healthcare workers in
New York).
176. Brian Dean Abramson, Vaccine Law in the Healthcare Workplace, 12 J. HEALTH &
LIFE SCI., no. 3, June 2019 at 22, 25–28. For a summary of state government vaccination
requirements for healthcare workers, see Vaccination Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (last reviewed Feb. 16, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/
vaccinationlaws.html [https://perma.cc/5D33-68DV].
177. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-467 (2022) (requiring employees of acute care
hospitals to be vaccinated for diphtheria, influenza, pertussis, and tetanus); ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 77, § 250.1820(f)(3) (2022) (requiring personnel working in hospital nurseries to
provide proof of immunity or vaccination for rubella); MD. CODE REGS. 10.06.01.12(D),
.15(D) (2022) (requiring hospital employees born after 1956 to document receipt of
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Vaccination as a condition of admission to public and private schools is
an example of a sector-specific policy.178 All fifty states require vaccination
against certain communicable diseases as a condition for school attendance.179
The vast majority of school vaccination laws apply to both public and private
schools.180 These policies are not uniform, but are nevertheless unanimous
or nearly unanimous with respect to several diseases.181 These mandates
are of paramount importance due to the absence of federal vaccination
requirements as a condition of admission to educational institutions.182
These requirements, and those applicable to healthcare workers, exemplify
governmental expertise in the fields of public health and vaccination,
expertise which is lacking in the vast majority of private businesses.183
Broader precedent applicable to the public at large is found in U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court
held that the government could compel smallpox vaccination in the interest
of preventing disease spread, despite the potential conflict with the liberty
interests of adult citizens.184 According to the Court, the government could
restrict the exercise of individual liberty interests that endanger the general
welfare.185 This restriction on liberty was based upon a “social compact”
in which individuals submitted to laws designed to secure “the common
vaccines for measles and rubella); N.M. CODE R. § 7.7.2.21(C) (2022) (requiring employees of
designated hospitals who are in direct contact with pediatric patients and female patients
of childbearing age to provide proof of immunity or vaccination for rubella); OHIO ADMIN.
CODE, 4715-20-01(A) (2022) (requiring dentists and dental health care workers to provide
proof of immunity from or vaccination for hepatitis B); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 310:667-54(a)(1) (2022) (requiring hospital workers born after 1957 to document their immunity to
measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella).
178. Abramson, supra note 176, at 25–29, 34–35.
179. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, STATE SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION
REQUIREMENTS AND VACCINE EXEMPTION LAWS 8 tbl.A1, 9 tbl.A2 (2022), https://www.
cdc.gov/phlp/docs/school-vaccinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/72KT-MJAK]. For a comprehensive
overview of state vaccination requirements as a condition for attendance at public and
private educational institutions, see generally Hodge & Gostin, supra note 18.
180. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 179, at 1, (noting that public
school vaccination laws often are equally applicable to private educational institutions). All
fifty state school vaccination laws are applicable to day care facilities. Abbie Goldbas,
The Law and Immunization in the United States, 31 INT’L. J. CHILDBIRTH EDUC., no. 2,
April 2016, at 41, 42.
181. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
182. See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 18, at 833–34, 889–90.
183. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 97 (2003).
184. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 37–39 (1905).
185. Id. at 26–31.
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good, for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people.”186
The legal authority for the restriction of liberty rested with Massachusetts’
police power, which “must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the
public health and the public safety.”187 This exercise of police power was
not extraordinary, as “persons and property are subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State.”188
The Court imposed three conditions upon the state’s authority to compel
vaccination.189 First, a vaccination requirement must be based upon a public
health necessity and could not be imposed in “an arbitrary, unreasonable
manner,” or go “far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety
of the public.”190 Second, any vaccination requirement must have a “real
or substantial relation” to public health and be a proportionate response,
rather than “a plain, palpable invasion of rights.”191 The third condition was
harm avoidance: That the requirement does not pose a health risk to
recipients.192 Subject to these conditions, implementation of vaccination
requirements was left to the discretion of the states.193
The U.S. Supreme Court has only decided one case directly addressing
vaccination in the years since Jacobson.194 The evolution of constitutional
jurisprudence has led some commentators to speculate on whether

186. Id. at 27 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. VII). The Court described the necessity
of the primacy of the social compact over individual liberty as follows:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution . . . does not import an absolute right
in each person to be . . . wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based
on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with
disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of
a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of injury that may be
done to others.
Id. at 26.
187. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
188. Id. at 26 (quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1854)).
189. Id. at 28, 31, 36–37.
190. Id. at 28 (citing Wis., Minn. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287, 301 (1900)).
191. Id. at 31 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887)).
192. Id. at 36–37. The Court concluded that to require immunization with the knowledge
that harm would occur would be “cruel and inhuman in the last degree.” See id. at 38–39.
193. Id. at 25 (concluding that “[t]he mode or manner in which those results are to
be accomplished is within the discretion of the State”).
194. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1922) (upholding a local government
requirement of vaccination as a prerequisite for enrollment in school).
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Jacobson’s largely deferential standards remain viable.195 The advent of
tiered scrutiny begs the question of what level of scrutiny would be applicable
to similar requirements considered by today’s courts.196 Modern perceptions
of liberty interests allow individuals to refuse unwanted medical
interventions.197 Would such interests permit a current objector to successfully
resist government-mandated vaccination?198 Additionally, the Court has
never addressed religious or philosophical objections in the context of a
vaccination requirement.199

195. See, e.g., James Colgrove & Ronald Bayer, Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public
Health, and the Legacy of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 571, 571,
575 (2005); Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power
and Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 580 (2005); Horowitz, supra
note 100, at 1730–45; Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz, Jacobson
v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J.
P UB. HEALTH 581 (2005); Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 894–901; Christopher
Richins, Jacobson Revisited: An Argument for Strict Judicial Scrutiny of Compulsory
Vaccination, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 44647 (2011); Michael H. Shapiro, Response,
Updating Constitutional Doctrine: An Extended Response to the Critique of Compulsory
Vaccination, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 87, 91–122 (2012).
196. See, e.g., Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2608 (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding that “it is a mistake to take language in Jacobson as the
last word on what the Constitution allows public officials to do during the COVID19 pandemic”); Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 549 F. Supp. 3d 836, 865 (N.D. Ind. 2021),
vacated, 24 F.4th 638 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Jacobson was written before the modern tiers of
constitutional scrutiny, so a legitimate question is the extent to which Jacobson applies
with full force today.”); see also Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 895–96 (citing Jacobson,
197 U.S. at 25) (characterizing Jacobson’s “highly deferential standard of reasonableness . . . as
a rudimentary precursor to a rational basis test” and, as such, noting that the Court failed
to review “the means used by the state to achieve its goal of protecting the public health”
(footnote omitted)).
197. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990)
(discussing the refusal or withdrawal of procedures to prolong life); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (“We have no doubt that . . . respondent possesses a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
198. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 100, at 1732 (contending that freedom from
vaccination is equivalent to the right to be free from unwanted medical interventions, thereby
requiring strict scrutiny of mandates).
199. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 898 (noting that although Jacobson was a
reverend, he was unable to assert a religious objection to vaccination as the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause would not be held applicable to the states through the doctrine of
incorporation until 1940).
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Questioning of the continued viability of Jacobson remains, however,
nothing more than speculation. 200 To the contrary, the Court has not
disavowed either its reasoning or the result.201 Rather, the Court has cited
Jacobson with approval on numerous occasions, and the opinion has been
cited hundreds of times by federal and state courts.202 It has been noted
that although “different fact patterns might yield different results,” the
principles elucidated in Jacobson remain “sound and well-established.”203
Furthermore, the Court issued its opinion in Jacobson at a time not
unlike today, involving “an easily-transmitted disease with a high fatality
rate during an epidemic.”204 Infectious diseases, such as smallpox, were
a leading cause of death in 1905, in a manner similar to COVID, which
was a leading cause of death in the United States in 2020 and 2021.205 The
continued viability of Jacobson may be an open question with respect to
less lethal and transmissible diseases and in the absence of the threat of
200. Klaassen, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 865 (noting that “[n]o Supreme Court opinion has
overruled or abrogated Jacobson”).
201. Id.
202. As of April 21, 2022, the opinion in Jacobson had been cited on 83 occasions by the
U.S. Supreme Court and 1,050 occasions by federal and state courts. Jacobson v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, WESTLAW, https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97bdcd899cc111d9
bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)
(choose “Cases” from the “Citing References” dropdown; then click “Filters”; then click
“Jurisdiction”; then apply the “Federal” and “State” filters).
203. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 901.
204. Id. (citing Smallpox Disease Overview, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Dec. 30, 2004), http://bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp [https://web.
archive.org/web/20150331075826/bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp]).
Smallpox had a higher fatality rate than COVID-19. Compare Mortality Risk of COVID19, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Aug. 24, 2022), https://ourworldindata.org/mortality-risk-covid
[https://perma.cc/352T-4JEA] (illustrating that the case fatality rate of COVID-19 reached
approximately 14.5%), with Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 901 (citing Smallpox
Disease Overview, supra) (stating that the case fatality rate of smallpox reached 30%).
The analogy presented in this Article between smallpox and COVID-19 is based on the
comparable high mortality rate.
205. See Jared Ortaliza et al., COVID-19 Continues to be a Leading Cause of Death
in the U.S. in June 2021, P ETERSON -KFF HEALTH S YSTEM TRACKER (July 1, 2021),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/covid-19-continues-to-be-a-leading-cause-ofdeath-in-the-u-s-in-june-2021/ [https://perma.cc/VE6Q-Z99D]; see also COVID-19 Mortality
Overview, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & P REVENTION , https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
covid19/mortality-overview.htm [https://perma.cc/QV42-C4TP ] (finding that COVID
resulted in 1,106,938 excess deaths in the United States between February 2020 and April
2022); Dan Keating, Akilah Johnson & Monica Ulmanu, The Pandemic Marks Another
Grim Milestone: 1 in 500 Americans Have Died of COVID-19, WASH. POST (Sept. 15,
2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/interactive/2021/1-in-500covid-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/B86Q-A87D] (noting that 1 in 500 Americans in the United
States had died of COVID as of September 2021 including 1 in 35 Americans over the age
of 85 years, 1 in 150 Americans between the ages of 65 to 84 years, and 1 in 780 Americans
between the ages of 40 and 64 years).
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community spread.206 But such is not the case with respect to COVID,
and thus the holding in Jacobson remains on point and a good fit for present
circumstances.207 Jacobson’s precursive endorsement of rational basis
review in the context of smallpox is well-suited for the national, state, and
local medical emergency posed by COVID. 208 This fit only improved
with the FDA’s full biologics license approval of the Pfizer-BioNTech,
Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson Janssen vaccines, thereby significantly
undercutting arguments that such vaccines fail to meet the third condition
set forth in Jacobson by posing a health risk to recipients.209
Even assuming that the standards set forth in Jacobson are outdated, a
COVID vaccination requirement would survive constitutional scrutiny as
a compelling state interest.210 The courts that have addressed this issue
have done so largely in the context of religious objections to mandatory
immunization as a requirement for school attendance.211 Nevertheless,
there is no reason to believe that the finding of a compelling state interest

206. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 901.
207. See id.
208. Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 549 F. Supp. 3d 836, 865–66 (N.D. Ind. 2021),
vacated, 24 F.4th 638 (7th Cir. 2022) (upholding Indiana University’s COVID vaccination
requirement for students in light of the holding in Jacobson and “modern tiers of constitutional
scrutiny” and concluding that “[s]hould the court have this melding of history and modernity
wrong in faithfully adhering to the Fourteenth Amendment’s plain original meaning of
‘life’ and ‘liberty,’ comfort should come in knowing that Jacobson, whether rational basis
review by any other name, leads to the same result today”).
209. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
210. See Gibson, supra note 20, at 543 (“[I]t is likely, given the strong compelling
[state] interest . . . that a well drafted and narrowly tailored vaccination policy could survive
strict scrutiny review.” (citing Horowitz, supra note 100, at 1747)).
211. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (W.D. Ark. 2002)
(“It has long been settled that individual rights must be subordinated to the compelling
state interest of protecting society against the spread of disease.”); In re Sherr v.
Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“It
has been settled law for many years that claims of religious freedom must give way in the
face of the compelling interest of society in fighting the spread of contagious diseases
through mandatory inoculation programs.”); Diana H. v. Rubin, 171 P.3d 200, 209 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2007) (“Because Arizona has not expressed a compelling state interest in
overriding Diana’s continuing fight to direct the religious upbringing of her child while
[the child] remains dependent . . . we vacate the juvenile court’s order . . . .”); Wright v.
DeWitt Sch. Dist. No. 1, 385 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Ark. 1965) (permitting the state to infringe
upon the right to free exercise of religion for the good of the community); Brown v. Stone,
378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979) (upholding a state program requiring immunization as a
condition for admission to public schools on the basis of a compelling public interest
despite religious objections).
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in school immunization cases would be inapplicable to a broader mandate
designed to stem the spread of a highly-transmissible disease presenting a
significant risk of death or serious illness in the midst of a once in a
century pandemic.212 To the contrary, the diseases addressed in the school
vaccination cases, while highly contagious and presenting the risk of
serious illness and death, are not of the present magnitude of COVID. 213
Furthermore, the state interest in school vaccination has proven to be more
compelling than the free exercise of religion, which is perhaps the highest
right guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.214 If the state’s
interest in eradicating childhood diseases is powerful enough to overcome
objections based upon a liberty interest as fundamental as free exercise,215
most assuredly it is equally powerful in the context of the COVID pandemic.
Public emergency laws provide an additional basis for finding a compelling
state interest for vaccination requirements. The Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) serves as a starting point in this discussion.216
Drafted in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and amplified
concerns about bioterrorism, MSEHPA was designed to be implemented
during a public health emergency which was defined, in part, as “an occurrence
or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that is believed to be
caused by . . . the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or
eradicated infectious agent.”217 This imminent threat of illness or adverse
health condition must present a “high probability” of a large number of
deaths, serious or long-term disabilities, or widespread exposure posing a
significant risk of substantial future harm.218 All three of these conditions
are clearly met by COVID.219
MSEPHA authorizes public health authorities to vaccinate persons against
infectious disease during a public health emergency and quarantine persons
who are unable or unwilling to undergo vaccination for health, religious,

212. See Colgrove & Bayer, supra note 195, at 571–72.
213. For example, in the decade prior to the development of the measles vaccine in
1963, there were approximately three to four million infections on an annual basis resulting
in five hundred deaths and forty-eight thousand hospitalizations. See Measles History,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/history. html
[https://perma.cc/TPE5-GWTY]. By comparison, there were 50.7 million COVID infections
resulting in 803,593 deaths at the time of preparation of this Article in December 2021.
See COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, supra note 16.
214. See, e.g., In re Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 88.
215. Id.
216. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, The CTRS. FOR L. & THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN &
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS. § 603 (Dec. 21, 2001).
217. Id. §104(m)(1)(ii). For a discussion of the factors motivating the drafting of
MSEPHA, see Horowitz, supra note 100, at 1728.
218. GOSTIN, supra note 216, §104(m)(2)(i)–(iii).
219. See sources cited supra note 16.
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or philosophical reasons.220 The laws in numerous states either duplicate221
or closely track MSEPHA’s public health emergency language.222 A
smaller number of statutes endorse MSEPHA’s vaccination provision.223
220. GOSTIN, supra note 216, § 603(a)(1)–(3).
221. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-9-3(4) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3132(11)(a)–
(b) (2022); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-1.1(2) (2022); IOWA CODE § 135.140(6) (2022); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 29:762(12) (2022); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-2 (2022); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 6104(2)(a)–(b) (2022); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.442(4) (2021); WIS. STAT. § 323.02(16)
(2022); WYO. STAT. ANN. §35-4-115(a)(i) (2022).
222. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 36-787(A) (2021) (defining a state of
emergency as “an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that is
caused by . . . an epidemic or pandemic disease . . . that poses a substantial risk of a significant
number of human fatalities or incidents of permanent or long-term disability”); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-131(8) (2022) (“‘Public health emergency’ means an occurrence or imminent threat
of a communicable disease . . . caused by . . . an epidemic or pandemic disease . . . that poses a
substantial risk of a significant number of human fatalities or incidents of permanent or
long-term disability.”); F LA. S TAT. §381.00315(1)(c) (2021) (“‘Public health emergency’
means any occurrence, or threat . . . which results or may result in substantial injury or harm
to the public health from infectious disease . . . .”); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 3305/4 (2022)
(“Disaster means an occurrence or threat of widespread or severe damage, injury or loss of
life . . . resulting from . . . [an] epidemic . . . .”); IND. CODE § 10-14-3-1(a), (b)(22) (2021)
(“‘[D]isaster’ means an occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or severe damage,
injury or loss of life . . . resulting from . . . [an] [e]pidemic.”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY
§ 14-3A-01(b) (LexisNexis 2022) (“‘Catastrophic health emergency’ means a situation in
which extensive loss of life or serious disability is threatened imminently because of exposure
to a deadly agent.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-10A-3(G) (2022) (“‘[P]ublic health emergency’
means the occurrence or imminent threat of exposure to . . . a highly infectious . . . agent,
including a threatening communicable disease, that poses an imminent threat of substantial
harm to the population of New Mexico or any portion thereof.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A475(d) (2011) (“‘[P]ublic health threat’ means a situation that is likely to cause an immediate
risk to human life, an immediate risk of serious physical injury or illness, or an immediate
risk of serious adverse health effects.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-130(P), (R)(2) (2022)
(stating that a public health emergency is “the occurrence or imminent risk of a qualifying
health condition” which is defined as “an illness or health condition that may be caused
by . . . [an] epidemic or pandemic disease . . . and that poses a substantial risk of a significant
number of human fatalities, widespread illness, or serious economic impact to the agricultural
sector”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-22-41 (2022) (“[A] public health emergency is an
occurrence or imminent threat of an illness, health condition, or widespread exposure to an
infectious . . . agent that poses a significant risk of substantial harm to the affected population.”);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.003(7)(A)–(B)(ii) (West 2021) (defining a public
health disaster as a declaration by the governor of the existence of an immediate threat
from a communicable disease that “poses a high risk of death or serious harm to the public;
and creates a substantial risk of harmful public exposure”); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.06
(2006) (defining “[c]ommunicable disease of public health threat” as a readily transmissible
infectious agent “found to create a risk of death or significant injury or impairment”).
223. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-787(C)(1) (2022) (authorizing the governor
to order vaccination of persons who are diagnosed with or believed to have been exposed

521

DHOOGE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2022 2:37 PM

State governments have an additional interest in requiring vaccinations
based upon the nature of the COVID pandemic and associated illnesses.
From this point of view, the weight of the state interest depends upon “the
nature, communicability, and consequences” of the vaccine-targeted disease.224
Applying this standard, states have a compelling interest in vaccinating
against diphtheria and smallpox, given their highly contagious nature, methods
of transmission, serious potential complications, and lower effectiveness
of post-infection treatment.225 This interest is less significant with respect
to or may reasonably be expected to be exposed to “a highly contagious and highly fatal
disease with transmission characteristics similar to smallpox”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a131e(a) (2022) (empowering the state commissioner of public health to order vaccination
of individuals “within a geographic area as the commissioner deems reasonable and
necessary in order to prevent the introduction or arrest the progress of [a] communicable
disease”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3137(1) (2022) (authorizing the director of the
Delaware Emergency Management Agency to “direct vaccination of persons as protection
against infectious disease and to prevent the spread of contagious or possibly contagious
disease”); FLA. STAT. § 381.00315(2)(d)(4) (2022) (empowering the state health officer to
order vaccinations for “communicable diseases that have significant morbidity or mortality and
present a severe danger to public health”); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-3(a) (2022) (authorizing the
Georgia Department of Public Health and county boards of health to mandate vaccination
against “contagious or infectious disease where the particular disease may occur, whether
or not the disease may be an active threat”); IOWA CODE § 135.144(6) (2022) (empowering
the Iowa Department of Public Health to order vaccination against “an infectious disease
and to prevent the spread of communicable or potentially communicable disease”); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 2305/2(e) (2022) (authorizing the state department of public health to order
the administration of vaccines “as necessary in order to prevent the probable spread of a
dangerously contagious or infectious disease”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:764(A)(2)(e) (2021)
(authorizing mandatory vaccination as part of a disaster emergency plan); MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-03(b)(3)(ii) (LexisNexis 2022) (authorizing mandatory vaccination
“[i]f medically necessary and reasonable to treat, prevent, or reduce the spread of the
disease or outbreak believed to have been caused by the exposure to a deadly agent”);
MINN. STAT. § 12.39(1) (2021) (empowering the state commissioner of health to order
vaccination of individuals who have been infected or exposed or reasonably believed to
have been infected or exposed to a communicable disease); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-14(a)
(West 2022) (authorizing the commissioner of health to “[r]equire vaccination of persons
as protection against infectious disease and to prevent the spread of a contagious or possibly
contagious disease”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-10A-13(A) (West 2022) (authorizing the state
secretary of health to vaccinate persons “to prevent infection by a threatening
communicable disease and to protect against the spread of that disease”); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-4-520(A)(1) (2022) (empowering the department of health and environmental control
to vaccinate persons against infectious or contagious disease or possibly contagious
disease during a public health emergency); VA. CODE ANN. §32.1-48(A) (2022) (allowing
the commissioner of health to require “immediate immunization of all persons in case of
an epidemic of any disease of public health importance for which a vaccine exists”); WIS.
STAT. §252.041(1)(a) (2022) (permitting the state department of health to order vaccination in
order to address a public health emergency).
224. See Hope Lu, Note, Giving Families Their Best Shot: A Law-Medicine Perspective
on the Right to Religious Exemptions from Mandatory Vaccination, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L.
REV. 869, 901 (2013).
225. See id. at 892–93; Nathanson, supra note 20, at 625–26.
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to hepatitis A and sexually transmitted diseases, which are not casually
communicable, result in less serious health complications, and are subject
to effective post-infection medical interventions.226 For the reasons previously
elaborated, COVID in general, and the Delta and Omicron variants in particular,
clearly meet the standards established by smallpox and diphtheria sufficiently
enough to constitute a compelling state interest in mandatory vaccination.227
Context and the resultant state interest in vaccination may be described
by other means. For example, applying principles of public health law, COVID
constitutes an ongoing threat that has been inadequately controlled through
less coercive means, such as testing, contact tracing, and quarantine. 228
Rising numbers of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths are convincing
evidence of the uncontrolled nature of the threat and the need for intrusion
upon individual autonomy through mandatory vaccination.229 The concept
of “focusing events” in political science literature—which consist of “sudden,
rare events that affect a relatively large number of people and thereby attract
media coverage and capture the attention of larger publics and policymakers”230
—also supports the existence of a compelling state interest to require
vaccination. The intensity of media coverage may “galvanize the public”
to the dangers associated with non-vaccination and cause policymakers to
place the majority’s interest in vaccination above that of minority objectors.231
Clearly, the advent of COVID is such a focusing event, which should cause
state governments to overcome inertia and act in a manner consistent with
the desires of the majority for improved health and a way forward through
the pandemic.232
There is state law precedent for a context-based approach to vaccination.
For example, Washington prohibits personal belief exemptions for vaccinations
deemed essential to the health and welfare of school age children—
226. See Lu, supra note 224, at 892 (noting that sexually transmitted infections are
not casually communicable diseases); Nathanson, supra note 20, at 626 (noting that Hepatitis
A is transmitted through the consumption of infected food and water).
227. See supra notes 205, 207–08 and accompanying text.
228. Michelle M. Mello, Ross D. Silverman & Saad B. Omer, Ensuring Uptake of
Vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1296, 1297 (2020).
229. Id.
230. Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of
Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809, 854 (2007) (citing THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER DISASTER:
AGENDA SETTING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING EVENTS 22–27 (1997)). See generally
Thomas A. Birkland, Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y
53 (1998).
231. Levin, supra note 26, at 1237 (citing Lytton, supra note 230, at 854).
232. See id.
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specifically, measles, mumps and rubeola—but allows exemptions for
other vaccines.233 Similar language may be found in other state statutes.234
Although these statutes are not without issues, they nonetheless define a
compelling state interest in certain vaccinations deemed essential to public
health.235
Regardless of the precise language or basis utilized to describe the
underlying events resulting in the creation of a compelling state interest, all
of the above circumstances must be prefaced on the availability of adequate
vaccines for the targeted population and the failure of voluntary efforts and
less coercive forms of persuasion.236 Both of these preconditions were satisfied
in the United States by mid-2021.237
The authority for requiring vaccination for COVID thus exists in the states.
The question remains whether state governments should exercise this authority.
The answer to that question is resoundingly in the affirmative.
State governments are uniquely positioned to formulate, implement,
and enforce effective vaccination requirements to a far greater degree than

233. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.210.080, 090(c) (2022).
234. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-30-3 (2022) (providing that “[i]n the absence of an
epidemic or immediate threat thereof,” parents can object “on grounds that [vaccination]
conflicts with his religious tenets and practices”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 76, § 15 (2022)
(providing that “[i]n the absence of an . . . epidemic of disease declared by the department
of public health, no child whose parent or guardian states in writing that vaccination or
immunization conflicts with his sincere religious beliefs shall be required to present [a]
physician’s certificate in order to be admitted to school”).
235. See, e.g., Tomsick, supra note 20, at 136–37 (questioning the basis for determining
when there is a threat of an epidemic which overrides objections to vaccination, whether
such statutes deem exemptions injurious to public health, and whether the preventative
nature of vaccines is inconsistent with post-pandemic declarations of public health emergencies).
236. See, e.g., Timothy J. Aspinwall, Religious Exemptions to Childhood Immunization
Statutes: Reaching for a More Optimal Balance Between Religious Freedom and Public
Health, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109, 114–15 (1997) (contending that “Religious advocates
reasonably can claim that the state has no moral authority to force citizens to subordinate
their religious beliefs to public health mandates when the state has not done all it can do
to advance the public health through voluntary means”); Mello, Silverman & Omer, supra
note 228, at 1297–98 (stating that availability to targeted populations and lack of success
of voluntary efforts should be preconditions to vaccination mandates).
237. See COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Aug. 10, 2021, 4:23 PM), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#
vaccinations_vacc-total-admin-rate-total [https://web.archive.org/web/20210810233655/
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations_vacc-total-admin-rate-total]
(documenting that eight months after the approval of the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna
vaccines for emergency use, only 50.3% of the eligible population in the United States was
fully vaccinated); see also Mello, Silverman & Omer, supra note 228, at 1298 (contending
that voluntary efforts with respect to COVID should be limited to “a matter of weeks”
rather than months given the costs associated with the failure of non-coercive means).
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the industrial sector.238 State governments can implement uniform vaccination
requirements across broad swathes of industries without fear of fragmented
approaches varying from industry to industry, among industry participants, or
different regions.239 This uniformity leads to greater efficiency than would
otherwise exist in individual industry approaches.240 Although enforcement
would undoubtedly be costly and require additional or reallocated public
resources, which may be scarce, these burdens are more readily assumable
by state governments which have access to greater resources and enforcement
experience, including those related to vaccination requirements in public
schools.241 There is a growing willingness of state governments to exercise
this authority in a wide variety of areas including state employees, health
care workers, and higher education.242
State governments are also better able to implement wide -ranging
communication and public education strategies necessary to effectuate
vaccination requirements.243 These strategies are essential for several reasons.
Initially, it is incumbent upon governments to communicate information

238. See supra Part V; WEN W. S HEN , CONG . RSCH. S ERV., R46745, STATE AND
FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO MANDATE COVID-19 VACCINATION 4–8 (2022).
239. See supra notes 172–80 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part III (noting that private sector employers may resist implementing
vaccine mandates resulting in an ineffective and fragmented approach).
241. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 956 (discussing efficiency considerations
in the context of vaccination policy).
242. See, e.g., What Colleges Require the COVID-19 Vaccine?, BESTCOLLEGES (Mar.
22, 2022), https://www.bestcolleges.com/news/2021/10/11/list-of-colleges-that-requirecovid-19-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/L7GE-E22R]; Jim Brunner, Joseph O’Sullivan &
Paige Cornwell, Washington State Employees, Health Care Worker Must Be Vaccinated
Against COVID, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 9, 2021, 7:28 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/gov-jay-inslee-expected-to-announce-covid-19-vaccine-mandate-for-washingtonstate-employees/ [https://perma.cc/QL92-J7Z2] (discussing vaccination requirements for
public employees in California, New York, and Washington and for healthcare workers in
Washington); Marina Villeneuve, NY to Require State Employees to Get Vaccines, or Get
Tested, SEATTLE TIMES (July 28, 2021, 5:43 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/health/ny-to-require-state-employees-to-get-vaccines-or-get-tested/ [https://perma.cc/
4KHL-CBUW] (discussing vaccination requirements for patient-facing workers in stateowned hospitals and veterans homes in New York); see also supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
243. Given that the state government already has the infrastructure for vaccination
policies, it may be more efficient to “favor extension, alteration, or application in a new
context of an existing and familiar tool, rather than creation of a new tool from scratch.”
See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 956.
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about vaccine safety and efficacy, including knowledge limitations.244 This
is especially the case in circumstances in which the government is seeking
to compel vaccination. These communications also shape social attitudes
and, in particular, instill public trust.245 Building trust is a necessary component
of an effective policy, not only in persuading individuals to voluntarily
vaccinate, but also in “more coercive interventions . . . to secure the compliance
of those who cannot be persuaded.” 246 For those who are persuadable,
communication is essential to informed consent and ensuring that the decision
to be vaccinated is “the product of competent, voluntary, and informed
choices.”247 For those who are unpersuadable, information nevertheless
has value in its own right, although it may ultimately prove ineffectual in
securing individual consent.248
The superiority of governmental resources, experience, and expertise
extend beyond the vaccines themselves to include the aggregation and
publication of related information.249 For example, unlike individual industry
or business policies, a broad governmental requirement would result in a
sweeping collection of data regarding vaccination and noncompliance.
Such information may influence individual and collective decisions regarding
travel, the establishment or relocation of businesses, and general risk
assessment. Such information may also prove crucial to healthcare providers
and nongovernmental organizations in targeting campaigns to increase vaccine
uptake.250 The collection and dissemination of such information, which
244. See Mello, Silverman & Omer, supra note 228, at 1297 (noting the importance
of “transparent communication of the best available evidence about the vaccine’s safety
and efficacy” (citing Sarah Schaffer DeRoo, Natalie J. Pudalov & Linda Y. Fu, Planning
for a COVID-19 Vaccination Program, 323 [J]AMA 2458, 2458 (2020))).
245. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 955–56.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 954 (citing TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 117–21 (6th ed. 2009)). For a general discussion of individual autonomy
in healthcare decision making and the doctrine of informed consent, see BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra.
248. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 958 (“Financial and other incentives,
together with education, may change the calculus for Vaccine Resistant parents. It is doubtful
that anything short of mandates or direct coercion will change the behavior of Vaccine
Rejector parents.”).
249. For example, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act requires
that “[e]very laboratory that performs or analyzes a test that is intended to . . . diagnose a
possible case of COVID-19 shall report the results from each such test, to the Secretary of
Health of Human Services.” Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §18115(a), 134 Stat. 281, 574 (2022).
250. See Tomsick, supra note 20, at 136 (“[T]hese records [of vaccination rates]
equip nongovernmental organizations and health care providers with the information they
need to target efforts to increase vaccination rates.” (citing Caitlin Cardenas-Comfort &
Mary Majumder, Laws About Transparent School Vaccination Reporting: Public Health
Context and Ethics, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1687, 1688 (2019))).
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only governments may do on a macro-scale, are consistent with their
previously discussed communication and transparency obligations.251
Finally, governments are better positioned than industry to deflect criticism,
absorb blame, and punish non-compliance, if necessary.252 Although private
employers may choose to terminate individual employees, only governments
possess broad power to punish non-compliance on a collective basis.253
Potential penalties related to employment may include the suspension or
termination of public employees and stay-at-home orders of private and
public employees who are members of high priority groups refusing
vaccination.254 These penalties are in addition to other non-employmentrelated means of compelling vaccination, such as denial of tax credits and
access to nonessential government services and public schools, transportation,
and facilities.255 Other potential government-imposed penalties include
criminalization of non-vaccination or the imposition of civil fines.256 This
is not to advocate for these extremes, but rather merely to note that they
are exclusively available to governments.257
Although industry may be criticized as shirking its leadership role, a
restrained approach allows it to avoid controversy to a greater degree and
protect profits and reputation. For many industries battered by nearly two
years of pandemic-related financial crises and controversies over issues

251. See supra notes 244–47 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Where’s the Nanny State When We Need It? Require
the Vaccine!, WASH. P OST (Aug. 9, 2021, 6:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2021/08/09/wheres-that-nanny-state-when-you-need-it/ [https://perma.cc/5NQ7YLZZ] (urging state and local governments to “play bad cop” and “be the fall guy” by
requiring COVID vaccines for their constituents).
253. This statement by no means is intended to minimize the power of the private
sector which may include punishment beyond employment-related penalties such as
increased health insurance premiums for self-insured companies and denial of access to
business premises and private transportation. See, e.g., Michael Lederman, Maxwell
J. Mehlman & Stuart Youngner, Defeat COVID-19 by Requiring Vaccination for All. It’s
Not Un-American, It’s Patriotic., USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2020, 12:28 AM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/08/06/stop-coronavirus-compulsory-universal-vaccinationcolumn/3289948001/ [https://perma.cc/MH95-AUWW] (listing various means by which
governments and the private sector could punish those refusing vaccination).
254. Mello, Silverman & Omer, supra note 228, at 1298.
255. Lederman, Mehlman & Youngner, supra note 253.
256. See Mello, Silverman & Omer, supra note 228, at 1298.
257. See id. (noting that criminal penalties and civil fines are poor public health
policy choices as they disadvantage the poor, invite legal challenges, and fuel distrust of
government without increasing vaccine uptake).
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such as mask mandates, passivity in the face of government leadership
may be a welcome development.258
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of their public or private origin, COVID vaccinations will
remain contentious for the foreseeable future. Controversy swirls around
questions of individual autonomy versus contributing to the collective
good, the political weaponization of the pandemic in general, and vaccination
in particular, all in an increasingly divided nation. In such a highly polarized
society, the pandemic and vaccination have become additional logs on the
cultural fires that have increasingly consumed the country in recent years.
Given these circumstances, skepticism regarding the efficacy of vaccination
requirements is understandable. Successful public health policies rely heavily
upon a substantial degree of voluntary cooperation. 259 The underlying
assumption in a cooperative approach is that the underlying policy is
consistent with social attitudes and values.260 Although there is increasing
support for required COVID vaccination, the consistency of such support
with social norms is highly dependent on numerous factors beyond health
considerations.261 Cooperation may be compelled through requirements,
but coercive policies lacking widespread social support are difficult and
expensive to enforce and may promote evasion and workarounds.262
The social controversy regarding vaccination requirements has unavoidable
spillover into the political arena. Mandates and other forms of vaccination
coercion require political action, but such policies may encounter difficulties
navigating the political process.263 Reiss and Weithorn aptly note that “not
everything that’s normatively desirable is politically feasible.”264 The
political feasibility of vaccination mandates is dependent on many of the
same factors relevant to determining social support.265 This determination

258. See Rampell, supra note 252 (“Public officials must be willing to make unpopular,
sometimes controversial decisions that take the heat off private industry and protect the
public welfare.”).
259. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 955 (contending that “[p]ublic health policy
success typically depends on a substantial degree of voluntary cooperation”); see also
Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris, & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s Health: A
Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 120–21 (1999).
260. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 955.
261. See, e.g., KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor, supra note 17 (finding significant
differences in vaccination rates and willingness to be vaccinated depending upon race, gender,
age, education, income, geographic location, and political affiliation).
262. Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 955.
263. Id. at 956.
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
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is further complicated by the unpredictability associated with human
aspects of politics such as negotiation and compromise, the impact of data
gleaned from polling, and self-preservation in the form of ensuring election,
reelection, and continued incumbency.266 Electoral politics may result in
changes to the composition of legislative bodies with a resultant impact
on administrative agencies and the makeup of the judicial branch. Such
changes contribute to unpredictability given their often unknown future
impact.267 All of these factors may serve to render coercive health policies,
such as vaccination mandates, politically unfeasible. That said, what is
impossible today may prove within the realm of reality tomorrow, not only
due to changes in the political climate, but also in response to escalating
public health crises, such as rapidly expanding outbreaks of vaccine preventable
disease and COVID’s highly contagious Delta and Omicron variants in
particular.268
These hurdles may cause some to dismiss mandates as socially unsupported
and politically unpalatable. However, the alternative is even more distasteful,
specifically, the surrender of public health to the control of a minority who
refuse vaccination. Public health considerations are not limited to physical
well-being, but also include the mental and emotional well-being of a
population battered relentlessly by an unforgiving disease. This surrender
is also a ceding of control over individual and collective economic wellbeing, which cannot be recovered without widespread vaccination.
Such a result is inconsistent with social welfare and is politically
indefensible. It is also inconsistent with the law. One need look no further
than Jacobson v. Massachusetts for rejection of minority control of public
health. The Court recognized that the creation of a minority privilege to
defy the will of the public presents “the spectacle . . . of the welfare and safety
of an entire population being subordinated to the notions of a single individual
who chooses to remain a part of that population.”269 The Court refused “to
hold it to be an element in the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United
States that . . . a minority of persons . . . should have the power thus to dominate
the majority when supported in their action by the authority of the State.”270

266. See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 18, at 956 & n.295.
267. Id. at 956 n.295.
268. Id. (noting that “increasing outbreaks of vaccine preventable diseases may
facilitate adoption of new policies not previously politically-feasible”).
269. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37–38 (1905).
270. Id. at 38.
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Such a result was indefensible in 1905 and should remain so over one hundred
years later.
The COVID vaccines, not unlike their smallpox counterpart at issue in
Jacobson, offer us a respite, if not a complete escape, from the pandemic
and the opportunity to begin to repair the enormous damage inflicted in its
wake. The country has been repeatedly reminded of this fact by members of
the medical and public health communities. It is time the country heeds
this advice and, by coercion or mandate, requires vaccination as a condition
of employment in designated industries and sectors.
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